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PREFACE
My interest in what we call Southeast Asia and, in 
particular, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization began 
some time ago. Part of my Naval service was spent in the 
general area, but it was during the 19 59-1962 Laotian Crisis 
that my professional interest was most particularly aroused. 
Press reports during the period of the crisis were inconclu­
sive and my curiosity concerning the diplomatic moves of our 
country and its allies made me wonder what was taking place 
behind the scenes. The subsequent settlement of the crisis 
raised serious questions concerning the efficacy of the 
SEATO alliance that had been in effect since 1955.
In pursuit of answers to my questions I used the 
standard sources of data contained in the University 
library and then found it necessary to pursue more elusive 
aspects on their home grounds. Through arrangements made 
with the United States State Department I was able to travel 
extensively throughout some SEATO nations. Although travel 
arrangements could not be made to enter Pakistan at this 
time, I was able to make a study in Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Japan, Korea, Singapore, the Philippines, South Vietnam, 
Thailand, Laos, India, Nepal, Lebanon, Greece, Italy, France 
and Germany. The success of the trip was due in no small
ii
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measure to the excellent cooperation that was obtained from 
the embassies and missions during the course of the trip.
Of particular note was the seven days I was able to 
spend in Bangkok at the SEATO Headquarters, where every aid 
and courtesy was extended by the staff of the Secretariat.
His Excellency, the Honorable General Jesus Vargas, Secre­
tary General of SEATO, was most kind in letting me interview
him on three separate occasions. These meetings with various
officials lent deep insight into the various countries 
outlooks.
I am indebted to the Chairman of the Political 
Science Department at the University of Montana, Dr. Leo 
Lott, to Dr. Forest L. Grieves, and to Sally A. Vogel who
served on my committee and gave aid and comfort. Any
conclusions presented here are, of course, my own 
responsibility.
Ill
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION
History has recorded the formation, and then 
extinction, of many organizations that were brought 
together to bring some form of security to the collective 
membership. At the heart of almost every formation of any 
organization has been the expectation that the member-units 
perceived that they would receive from such membership. If, 
on one hand, they failed to receive what they perceived to 
be "right and proper," then membership desirability would 
decline.
It is becoming increasingly obvious that SEATO,^
The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, is a victim of the 
disillusionment that sets in when member-units of such an 
organization have failed to receive enough of those true 
benefits for which they were originally organized.
Contiguity is not a critical qualitative factor in 
the formation of any organization; it nevertheless can be 
expected to play an important role, depending on other 
factors which may or may not be in co-incidence. While one 
of the underlying premises of this study is that the
ISee Appendix B for abbreviations used in this
paper.
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2
dis-contiguity of the member-units Is an important factor 
in what has been and is happening to SEATO,2 the major 
premise is that the "out-side" issues of the SEATO members 
have so dominated individual attention as to render effec­
tive cooperation within the organization increasingly 
impossible because of a conflict of political considerations
SEATO is at best a consultive organ, but more 
importantly it requires unanimity prior to any action that 
needs to be taken by the organization. It therefore follows 
that there must be some type of common thinking or like- 
mindedness on the part of the participants if any agreement 
is to be reached. Increasingly, however, factors external 
to SEATO have created a dysfunctionalism which has caused 
deterioration to set in. The national interests of the 
members, on an individual basis (particularly France,
Britain and Pakistan), have been redirecting their major 
focus of foreign policy away from Southeast Asia, and hence 
away from SEATO.
While granting the importance of a detailed study 
of the internal political structure of the individual states 
which make up the SEATO body, it is necessary to confine 
this discussion to a study of the interaction among some 
SEATO states as they reacted to specific political events 
on the international scene. The thesis then poses the
2See Appendix A for meetings of the organization.
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general question as to whether or not the individual country 
reactions to the specific political events examined later on 
in any way contributed to the general decline in attitude 
toward SEATO by those same countries. It should be readily 
recognized that a decline within the SEATO powers in regard 
to country attitudes toward stated SEATO goals has set in. 
The question at hand is what has been the cause or causes to 
make this happen.
An overview of the past and present together is 
necessary to correlate what is taking place. The political 
phenomenon is an elusive thing. For the most part, it can 
be illogical to both participants and viewers. While the 
goals of one nation or unit may "appear" to be most logical 
to their intended aspirations, given the conditions of the 
times, they might be quite contradictory to "naturally 
assumed" allies.
Politics and people are indivisible, bringing into 
focus a sum or totality of environment and conditions. What 
must be remembered is that these conditions are the handi­
work of time and events, and that what occurs in the present 
is the result of what has transpired in the past.
Such a truism formed the background for those units
oand actors which came together to form SEATO.
^The terms "actor," "state," and "unit" are used 
interchangeably. The term "actor" is also used for an 
individual.
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Many political developments have taken place prior 
to and since the formation of SEATO. If total precedence 
were placed on "formal" political events such as confer­
ences, meetings, and the like, resultant conclusions could 
prove deceptive or, at the least, superficial.
The Geneva Conference preceded the Manila Confer­
ence. The Berlin Conference preceded the Geneva Conference, 
and the Bermuda Conference preceded the Berlin Conference.
By themselves, these political events are important, and, 
taken together, they begin to form a picture of interaction 
among the various states of the Global System. But this is 
not enough to form a true analysis.
A feeling for History, as Churchill put it, is 
essential. But other ingredients and factors must also be 
added to obtain as complete a picture as possible. Events, 
political ones in particular, do not just come about.
People make them, and there are forces working behind them 
that cause them to act in the manner that they do.
What about the leaders or actors of these nations: 
what was their background; at what stage in their political 
careers were they; what were some of the motives that guided 
them? Who, individually or collectively, had "bargaining 
power"? These are questions that should be looked into. At 
the same time, it is essential that a perspective is given 
to this, for much of the discussion hinges on how the sepa­
rate leaders of the SEATO nations saw SEATO in relation to 
how it would benefit their own particular nation.
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The Manila Conference occurred one and one half 
months after the Geneva Conference, which had met primarily 
to discuss the Korean and the Indo-China questions. That 
the two are interrelated should not be subject to question. 
However, it does not necessarily follow that the creation 
of SEATO at the Manilla Conference was a direct outgrowth 
of the results of the Geneva Conference.
Causal factors emerged as a force behind this 
political move on the part of the United States under the 
directorship of former Secretary of State Dulles to create 
SEATO. A quick explanation of two items can perhaps best 
simplify and delimit the dichotomy that was present at the 
time in Washington: the establishment of a "peaceful"
status quo, and the recognition that there was now on the 
global scene a power that could upset what had supposedly 
been achieved on the battlefield, "victory for democracy."
First, there was (and perhaps still remains) a 
persistency on the part of the victors at the conclusion 
of World War II to "create" a new world order. Having 
established some modicum of stability with their victory, 
they sought a restoration of the status quo, and to give 
legitimacy and "legalize" that condition, formed the 
universal body of the United Nations. In this way, the 
powerful victors, having permanent seats in the Security 
Council of the United Nations, could wield effective use 
or control of coercive power to put down any state or
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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grouping of states that sought to upset this balance now 
supposedly achieved.
Second, having come to realize that it was one among 
their own group of victors (the Soviet Union) that sought to 
change the status quo, and it being a strong power,^ the 
next "logical" step was to create some sort of force or 
deterrence that would dissuade any overt challenge to the 
balance of power that had been established. To do this 
would require some collective force that would be credible. 
The creation of NATO,^ as a "shield" to Europe was their 
answer. This was the beginning of the general policy of 
containment and encirclement which was to be followed by 
SEATO and, ultimately, by the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO). 
Good and necessary as this economic plan and later protec­
tive shields were, it nevertheless set in motion certain 
social, economic, and political forces which continue to 
affect world relations.
Many observers would classify the split which exists 
between East and West as ideological. Some of those same 
people would mark this split as being distinct by the end
^The Soviet Union is generally accredited with the 
title of "superpower" after her acquisition of a nuclear 
device (September 2 3, 1949) with credible means of delivery.
^NATO came into being April 4, 1949. It has 15 
member states: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece,
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, West Germany.
(Greece, Turkey, and West Germany were later signatories 
to the Treaty.)
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of World War II and at the beginning of the Soviet Union’s 
push into Eastern Europe.
An ideology had taken root in a previously backward 
country (Russia). That society had now emerged and asserted 
itself not only internally, but through ideology externally 
as well.
World War I shattered empires in Europe. World 
War II shattered empires all over the globe, and colonialism 
was being cast aside. Millions of people were now forged 
into newly formed states, notwithstanding the fact that many 
of these newly-formed entities did not even have an indige­
nous professional or college graduate within their popula­
tion^ with which to make the crudest sort of a beginning of 
a modem political infrastructure.^
Ginis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares (3rd 
rev.; New York: Random House, 196 4) , pp. 2 88 , 29 8-299 . See 
also John G. Stoessinger, The Might of Nations: World
Politics in Our Time (New York : Random ”House7 196 5) , 
pp. 127-129 . for an Asian view see Ayub Khan, "Pakistan 
Perspective," Foreign Affairs, XXXVIII, No. 4 (July, 1950), 
548. See also Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Islam and National Inte­
gration in Pakistan," Asian Political Systems: Readings on
China, Japan, India, Pakistan, ecH Betty B. Burch and 
Allan B. Cole (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 
1968) , p. 340 .
^Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, The 
Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, I960), p. 11. The editors argue effec­
tively that any society, no matter how primitive, has 
political structure. However, in the "competitiveness" that 
exists in the Global System, one criterion for success and 
achievement would be a more advanced form of political 
structure with the ramifications that go along with it.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Peoples previously held back by the superimposition 
or dominance of alien cultural values (including coercive 
power) now had some opportunity to readjust their newly 
obtained independence with their own societal values.^
It was with this type of background that SEATO, 
under the guiding hand of John Foster Dulles, American 
Secretary of State, came into being.
Events, bearing directly and indirectly on the 
countries uniting in SEATO, occurred rapidly. Europe had 
had its "Soviet" scare, NATO was born, the Warsaw Pact was 
created, Chiang Kai-shek fled from the mainland of China 
and Mao Tse-Tung was in power. The Netherlands were in the 
throes of trying to re-establish colonial control over the 
Dutch East Indies (later Indonesia), and were meeting 
mounting resistance in their efforts. The French were 
engrossed in the same process in Indo-China. And finally, 
the Korean War had begun, helping to some degree in the
®Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communica­
t e  (2nd ed.; Cambridge: HrT"Press   ; pp": 3T7 To^HT;
191. See also Norman D. Palmer and Howard C. Perkins, 
International Relations: The World Community in Transition
(3rd ed.; New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1969 ),' pp. 4^8-449 ; 
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for
Power and Peace (4th ed.; New York: Alfred Knopf, 1967), 
pp, 83-86 ; A. G. K. Organski, World Politics (2nd ed.; New 
York: Alfred Knopf, 196 8), pp. 29, 189. For an Asian view 
see Ayub Khan, "Pakistan Perspective," Foreign Affairs, 
XXXVIII, No. 4 (July, 1960), 548. See also Khalid Bin 
Sayeed, "Islam and National Integration in Pakistan," Asian 
Political Systems: Readings on China, Japan, India,
Pakistan, ed. Betty B. Burch and Allan B. Cole (Princeton: 
Dl Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1968), p. 340.
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election of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United 
States because of his promise to go there and bring peace.
The passage of eight years since the end of World 
War II, created, in certain quarters in the United States, 
an intense feeling of hostility toward the Soviet Union and 
the Communist menace it was felt to represent. The era of 
"McCarthyism" was a manifestation of this attitude.9 On top 
of this also lay a mixed feeling of betrayal through the 
loss of mainland China to a Communist regime. The cases of 
Owen Lattimore, Alger Hiss, and Whittaker Chambers revealed 
some of this feeling.
With the introduction of "Chinese volunteers" on a 
massive scale into the Korean conflict against American and 
allied forces, it may be easily understood why the elector­
ate of the United States reacted in the anti-Chinese 
(Communist) and anti-Russian fashion as it did. John 
Foster Dulles, appearing on the political and diplomatic 
scene at this time, gave expression to these feelings 
through an American anti-communist, foreign policy, which 
met with no objection from President Eisenhower.
^Excellent accounts of this stage are given in 
D. F. Flemming, The Cold War and Its Origins (Garden City, 
N.Y.: Doubleday S Company, 1961), Yol 1, pp. 331-540;
Vol. II, pp. 543-706. See also John Lukacs, A New History 
of the Cold War (3rd. ed.; Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 
Doubleday ê Co., 1962), pp. 58-136. For more detailed 
account of this period see chapters 21, 22, 29, 34, 38, 57, 
and 70 of Dean Acheson, Present at Creation (New York:
W. W. Norton S Company, 1969). See also Wayne S. Cole, An 
Interpretive History of American Foreign Relations (Home- 
wood. In.: The Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 521-542 .
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Elsewhere, politics were in flux. France, during 
the continuing period of the Fourth Republic, still suffered 
from domestic instability, which from 1950 to the end of 
the Geneva Conference saw eight governments come and go.
In many respects, it was a tragic replay of the 19 30 's when 
similar political instability marked the French Third 
Republic.
England, with a semblance of stability, nevertheless 
faced mounting economic problems. Before World War II, the 
English pound sterling was probably looked upon as the most 
stable currency in the world and the one currency upon which 
world traders pegged their transactions. With the tremen­
dous expenditures in men, material, and other resources that 
World War II cost the English, the pound sterling has never 
really recovered its preferred status.!*^ Since the war, two
*̂̂ F. S. Northedge, British Foreign Policy (New York: 
Frederick Praeger, 1962), ppl 33-39. "Britain’s economic 
plight at the end of World War II was extremely grave. One 
fourth of her national wealth had been used up in fighting 
the war" ( 7,300 million). On August 21, 19 45, President
Truman signed a proclamation ending lend-lease. This put an 
even heavier burden on the British: 4,200 million of
British foreign assets had been sold to help pay for arms 
aid. "Britain, a recipient of nearly two thirds of all 
lend-lease was now expected to assume liability for supplies 
in transit or in British hands or waiting to be delivered 
under existing contracts. The shock of this decision, 
effected without consultation with the British Government, 
was such that Churchill, now leader of the Opposition, said 
he could not believe it was the last word of the United 
States on the subject. . . . "  The result was that a loan 
was arranged ( 9 30 million) with 2 per cent interest. In
addition, Britain had to agree to terms that : she undertake
to make sterling freely convertible into other currencies 
not later than twelve months after the loan agreement came 
into force; not to apply quantitative restrictions
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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devaluations of the pound have marked its decline. At one 
time, the Bank of England could probably have withstood any 
abnormal run on the pound. That situation no longer existed 
and major stabilizing measures were brought to bear from 
international sources such as the World Bank or the Inter­
national Monetary Fund. Britain’s economy was spent, and 
an increased trade was necessary to gain its goal of 
recovery.
For centuries England had reigned supreme as a world 
power. Two World Wars, irrespective of the fact that they 
were victorious, had bled the British to the point where 
they were nearly fiscally prostrate. From the heights of 
world prominence and leadership, the British now found 
themselves in a very definitely lowered position with regard 
to big power consultations on world affairs. It was a 
position that they were not used to.
At the same time, the vaunted Empire that England 
had had, was fast disappearing as country after country 
broke away to establish its independence. A definite 
decline had set in for the British that they found hard to 
stop or even slow down.
discriminatingly against dollar goods, which implied that 
any British restrictions on purchases from the United States 
applied in order to conserve dollars would have to extend 
to imports from every part of the world; consented to enter 
into negotiations with countries holding British sterling 
liabilities with a view either to scaling them down or 
refunding them; from the American point of view this would 
have the effect of diverting to the dollar market the 
import demands of countries holding sterling balances which 
they might otherwise liquidate by purchases in Britain.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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If anything, the Suez adventure of 19 56 (which will 
be fully discussed later) could be viewed as a last desper­
ate attempt on the part of the British to re-instate them­
selves as a world power with which to be reckoned.
As is to be pointed out. United States' reaction to 
this British move, along with the French and Israelis, came 
as a shock to the British. This was further compounded 
by the manner in which the United States treated British 
interests in the United Nations in obtaining a cease-fire 
and subsequent withdrawal of combatant forces from the 
canal area. A British "dream" of the "Imperial Lifeline" 
was broken for all time to come. What had been a British 
bastion in South Asia and the Far East was long gone. Now, 
the symbolic link itself was irretrievably broken.
The closing of the Berlin Conference (January 25- 
February 19, 1954) in which the United States, Soviet Union, 
France, and Great Britain participated, brought with it 
the decision to set up a meeting of states at Geneva to 
work out details for a general peace in Korea. Communist 
China (over the objections of Dulles) was made party to 
the conference^ which also was to deal with the Indo-China 
situation.
The Berlin Conference had been concerned mainly with 
European issues--NATO pressures on the Soviet Union, German
^^Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Cambridge: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1960), pp. 84, 99.
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reunification, and the European Defense Community ( E D O . 
Here, there was some disagreement among the allies. France 
was under pressure from both Britain and the United States 
to implement the EDO so that there could be a greater 
"military solidarity" against any "potential" aggressor. 
France was hesitant as it was a desire of the French leaders 
to maintain a military superiority over the West German 
nation.
At the Geneva Conference (April 26-July 21, 1954), 
the differences that were beginning to appear among the 
allies showed themselves to an even greater degree.
Dulles had begun to sound out various powers 
concerning a form of collective defense arrangement for the 
Far East. But his timing was bad, and he was being opposed 
by the B r i t i s h . T h e  main British view was that any 
formation of a "bloc" of defense in Southeast Asia should 
await developments at Geneva so as not to compromise the 
talks.
There was an incongruity about these events, for 
although the American position was to set up some type of 
defense in Southeast Asia against the Communist enemy,
China, the allied (this refers mainly to Britain, France,
^^Britain, still remaining with her policy of 
contact with the Commonwealth, had found that Nehru was 
adamantly opposed to the formation of any type of bloc 
arrangement in Southeast Asia. See Northedge, op. cit., 
p. 30. See also John Robinson Beal, John Foster Dulles 
(New York: Harper S Bros., 19 5 7), pp. 210-211. See also 
"Did U.S. Almost Get Into War?" U.S. News and World 
Report, June 19, 1954, pp. 35-39.
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and the United States) unity which was essential for the
success of any type of venture such as this, was being
X 3severely tested upon strictly European questions. The 
"allied" position could not have appeared more futile.
At Geneva, the end came quickly for the French.
Dien Bien Phu fell during the conference, and the Laniel 
Government collaped. Pierre Mendes-France, the new French 
Premier, stated that he would end the stalemate at Geneva 
in one month or resign. The impasse was broken, and a 
cease-fire agreement with subsequent new alignments of the 
Indo-China states was made.
The United States, free of commitments at Geneva, 
now concentrated on the establishment of what was to become 
SEATO. The invited states met at Manila to fashion the 
details for this new bulwark against Communism. Present 
were Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, 
the Philippines, Thailand, and the United States. The SEATO 
Treaty and corresponding Pacific Charter were the result of 
this Manila Conference. That result was a "consultive" 
agreement.
l^Tang Tsou, "The American Political Tradition and 
the American Image of Chinese Communism," Political Science 
Quarterly, LXXVÏI (December, 1962), 5 7 1 - 5 See also 
Bernard Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place (New York: J. B. 
Lippincott Company, 19 66), pp. 461-462. See also "Why 
Diplomats Are in Trouble," U.S. News 6 World Report, May 21, 
1954, pp. 25-38.
^^The United States did not sign the Geneva Agree­
ments, but instead. General Walter Bedell Smith, Under 
Secretary of State, made an oral declaration that the United 
States would adhere in principle to these agreements.
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SEATO should be looked at in the overall perspective 
of the general political questions that were then dominant, 
and not in the false light of being a new entity in the 
Asian area, or even of being the "final" pact that finished 
the encircling containment of Communism in Eurasia.
The gathering of these diverse states into SEATO was 
a crude amalgamation--Dulles' attempt to complete some kind 
of a "containment" of the Communist menace that he saw.
That Communism was expanding depends on one’s frame of 
reference. Dulles’ grouping together of these states, in 
addition to being a mistake in timing, was also a miscalcu­
lation of the nature of the units he brought together.
There can be no denial that at least in Australia 
and New Zealand such a "breakaway" move from dependency on 
Britain to closer association with the United States was 
welcomed. SEATO could be viewed as the culmination of the 
"Pacific Defense Fact" that Dulles had envisioned during 
the negotiations on the Japanese Peace Treaty. It was in 
some ways complementary to the ANZUS Treaty. As Leicester C. 
Webb, writing in SEATO: Six Studies, points out repeatedly, 
Australia and New Zealand were far from satisfied in the 
roles that their countries had previously played in the 
overall British picture of Empire defense. In the two 
great wars, Australian and New Zealand troops had been taken
^^Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy: The
ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan (New York: University
Press, 1969), p . 66.
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from the Pacific area and transferred to the European and/or 
Middle Eastern area. The defeat of British forces in Hong 
Kong, Malaya, and Singapore during World War II by the 
Japanese and the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the 
Repulse— the main strength of the British fleet in the Ear 
East— brought home the fact to Australia and New Zealand 
that they had to find some type of arrangement that would 
give them a better security arrangement than they had had 
f^reviously within the British Commonwealth.
Î Britain was opposed initially to the creation of 
the ANZUS pact. When she later tried to gain membership on 
at least an observer basis, the application was rejected.^® 
But even this turn of events should not be taken at face
^®Leicester Webb, "Australia and SEATO," SEATO; Six 
Studies, ed. George Modelski (Melbourne, Australia! F. W. 
Cheshire), p. 55. "In the British House of Commons Winston 
Churchill, answering Labor attacks, said that he ’inherited 
a certain situation’ but that he had ’never concealed the 
fact’ that he regretted the manner in which the ANZUS Pact 
had developed. . . .  At the time the pact was signed the 
British Foreign Secretary, Herbert Morrison, told the House 
of Commons that ’it would not have been unwelcome to us if 
we had been included in the proposed pact,’ but that it was 
quite clear that the discussions would not work out this 
way. . . . Between 22 and 26  September, 1952 military repre­
sentatives of the parties of the Pact met in Honolulu and at 
the same time the United Kingdom let it be known that a 
request that British observers should attend the meetings 
had been rejected. For this decision the Australian and New 
Zealand governments were strongly attacked in Parliament and 
the Press. Both governments refused to disclose whether the 
exclusion of the United Kingdom had been at the instance of 
the United States and emphasized that the decision had been 
unanimous. In this connection it seems that main instiga­
tion came from the American Government." See Acheson, op. 
cit., pp. 6 86-6 88.
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value as a full satisfaction of Australian and New Zealand 
desires. So far, no governmental references are available 
indicating whether or not the ANZUS pact actually repre­
sented a quid pro quo for the signing of the Japanese Peace 
Treaty with which they were displeased.
The Australians, New Zealanders, and Filipinos could
be expected to go along with an American direction that
would place emphasis in the Pacific area. However, even in
the case of the Philippines, there was some reluctance to
enter into such a collective pact as can be noted in this
interview with Philippine President Magsaysay :
INTERVIEWER; Communism may not be a great menace in 
the Philippines now, but isn't it a danger elsewhere 
in Asia, and hence a threat to the Philippines? Do 
you think there is any need for a Pacific defense 
pact, possibly modeled after the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization?
MAGSAYSAY: Right now, it is difficult for us to enter
into any such alliance because we have our own problems 
here, and they are difficult to solve. We have home­
work to do. Our house is leaking very badly. If we 
don’t repair our house, the Communists would not need 
an invasion force to capture the Philippines ; we would 
simply go under because of our weaknesses. Unless we 
do something about land tenancy--if there is corruption 
in the government, if we can’t give our people three 
square meals a day, shelter and a piece of land— then 
we'll wake up some morning and find that the Communists 
have taken over. It won’t be an army coming from the 
Chinese mainland either, but our own hard core Commu­
nists capitalizing on our failures. . . .  Of course I 
am interested and always have been interested in the 
security of the Pacific, because that directly affects 
us. I feel, however, that it is important that we 
first attend to our own problems before anything else. 
Anyway, most of us have mutual-defense pacts with the 
United States, and each of us can contribute our share
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to the security of the Pacific by complying with our 
obligations under those pacts.
Britain and France, on the other hand, were less 
interested in the Pacific area. Britain still had her base 
in Singapore and had un ders t an dings with Malaya, Borneo, 
Brunei, Sarawak, and was, within the Commonwealth, committed 
to Australia and New Zealand.
Although the problem of colonialism in North Africa 
was beginning to trouble the French, the chief problems as 
they saw it remained in Europe. EDO was at the same time a 
political, military, and economic problem that threatened 
allied solidarity. German rearmament without restrictions 
was anathema to the French. The high stakes involved in 
being a world power meant that both Britain and France must 
belong to the "nuclear" club. The problem, though, was the 
cost involved.
There was little meaning in France joining SEATO.
A French presence in Southeast Asia after Dien Ben Phu could 
now be only on an economic level. Militarily, the French 
Army had had staggering losses, "the cream of its regular 
officers dead or crippled, the rest of them embittered 
and thinking little else but applying upon their own country
^’̂"Driving the Communists Out of the Philippines," 
an Interview with Ramon Magsaysay. President of the Philip­
pines, U.S. News S World Report, April 23, 1954, pp. 72-78.
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the same revolutionary-warfare methods as the Viet-Minh had 
used upon them.
The plight in which both Laniel and Mendes-France 
found themselves at Geneva was humiliating. Another 
"diplomatic" setting in Manila would not remove this blow 
which had befallen France. Perhaps Bernard Fall says it 
best;
And Bidault, like France herself, stood there alone.
The delegations of the three little Indo-Chinese 
states of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam were of little 
help at this juncture. The British Foreign Secretary, 
Anthony Eden, was the co-chairman (with Russia) of 
the conference and, in view of Britain’s role in the 
Indo-China conflict during the recent weeks, barely 
on speaking terms with his French colleague. As for 
the United States delegation, the Secretary of State, 
in one of his repeated confusions between the appear­
ance and reality of American prestige, had preferred 
to return to the United States and leave the American 
delegation in the capable but less prestigious hands 
of his Under Secretary, General Walter Bedell Smith. 
Bidault was reported to have said to an associate that 
he had come to Geneva with "a two of clubs and a three 
of diamonds" as his only diplomatic cards. As he 
looked around him before he began to speak, at his 
fellow Western diplomats and their embarrassedly down­
cast eyes and at the Communist diplomats staring at 
him unblinkingly, he was the very picture of France’s 
loneliness in her defeat.19
The United States was the chief architect of the 
Manila Conference (SEATO), and Thailand was perhaps the only 
power attending that was fully in accord with United States’ 
wishes. But even the Thais did not obtain what they really
1^Bernard B . Fall, The Two Viet-Nams: A Political
and Military Analysis (New York : Frederick A. Praeger,
T9'6 3)7 p.' 22 T.
19Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place, pp. H23-H2H.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
20
wanted. For SEATO become (Article IV of the Treaty,
Appendix C) a "consultive" body, and not the NATO-like 
structure that the Thais wanted. There were no defense 
forces assigned to SEATO. For the Pakistanis, SEATO 
represented an association with a "military" alignment that 
would somehow offset the insecurity they felt with regard 
to India.
The Brecher Concept
The trials and tribulations of SEATO may be some­
what explainable if viewed in the framework of Michael 
Brecher's theory of Dominant v. Sub-dominant systems. In 
this context, then, the treaty area of SEATO actually 
becomes subsidiary to the more internal concerns of the 
various powers of SEATO.
This does not mean that a base cause of SEATO 
troubles does not in reality stem from the ideological 
conflict that exists between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. A causal determinant might be closer to the 
truth of the situation if it can be determined what direc­
tion the individual nations are taking, and whether that 
direction is, if not coincidental, at least not in major 
conflict with the stated goals of SEATO.
If we can accept Michael Brecher's view, and at 
this point of time there would seem to be much validity in 
it, then it should be assumed for purposes of analytical 
probing that the concept of a "rivalry" or conflict between
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the various systems does in fact exist and serves as a base 
motive for other factors which appear on the international 
scene.
If we can assume that this has some basis in fact,
then we must look at this base problem in a longer time
continuum (longer in fact than the 15 years of SEATO exist­
ence). If then such a "yardstick" is used, we can perhaps
see the more basic and complex problem emerging that in 
reality is masked over by moves in other quarters.
While the base problem is not the focal point of 
this paper, it nonetheless serves as a primary factor when 
considering the way the power makeup of SEATO and its 
"environmental" fluctuation fits in when the actions of the 
individual powers or participants are viewed.
There are many demands which are both implicit and 
explicit in the maneuverings of the states which are going 
on at present. If we can use both the struggle between 
East and West and the evolution of the Brecher theory as 
a somewhat liberal frame of reference, then we can perhaps 
better understand the moves which are taking place within 
the entity that is SEATO.
Professor Brecher in an article on Southern Asia 
makes the point that there are five definable Subordinate 
Systems in the world--Southern Asian, Middle Eastern,
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American, West European, and West African.^0 At the same 
time he postulates that there is a superior Dominant System 
which is made up of the two superpowers. A further defi­
nition of levels is made within the Subordinate Systems, 
indicating some strengths and weaknesses of the various 
members. It is within this "structure" that the action and 
interaction of the various members of the systems, both 
Dominant and Subordinate, take place.
If Brecher's concept of the "Southern Asia system"
is accepted, it then follows that his further definition
of the makeup of that system must also be used:
(1) its scope is delimited, with primary stress on a 
geographic region; (2) there are at least three actors; 
(3) taken together, they are objectively recognized by 
other actors as constituting a distinctive community, 
region, or segment of the Global system; (4) the mem­
bers identify themselves as such; (5) the units of power 
are relatively inferior to units in the Dominant System, 
using a sliding scale of power in both; and (6) changes 
in the Dominant System have a greater effect on the 
Subordinate system than the reverse.21
Just as the sub-systems are different according to 
their own particularistic^, so too are the nations and 
actors that make up the sub-systems. Determinants of power 
(as A. F. K. Organski describes it) or elements of power 
(as Hans J. Morgenthau describes it) can be important when 
trying to make an evaluation of the moves and counter-moves
^^Michael Erecher, "The Subordinate State System 
of Southern Asia," International Politics and Foreign 
Policy, ed. James Rosenau (Rev. ed.; New York: The Free 
Press, 1969), p. 156.
21lbid., p. 157.
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that the nations make. Geography, national resources, 
industrial capacity, population, national character, nation­
al morale, quality of government— all of these go into the 
complex makeup of the societies and cultures that in turn 
creates the nation-state, which combined with other con­
tiguous counterparts, makes up the sub-system. 22
It is highly useful, and even necessary, to under­
stand these individual differences between the varied states 
that make up SEATO. Such tools or determinants as these 
Political Scientists use are meaningful, for if used pro­
perly, they can give a perspective to the sometimes blurred 
international picture. It is from these basic sources that 
most goals of the nation-states are evolved.
The argument here is that, from the beginning of 
SEATO, there were two mis judgments, one at the subordinate 
level, the other at the sub-system level. The subordinate 
error was that Britain and France, although client units of 
the Dominant System, were nonetheless primary members of 
the West European System. In this case, the West European 
System and Dominant System were on divergent courses rather 
than coincidental paths. The sub-system error was that 
there were serious miscalculations in all four steps of the 
unifying force concept (see page 35), the most serious being 
in the recognition of the need for unity and in the rewards
22Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The
Struggle for Power and Peace (4th e3.; New York: Alfred 
Knopf, 196 7), pp. 106-143; and A. F. K. Organski, World 
Politics (2nd ed.: New York: Alfred Knopf, 1968), pp. 87-189
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for grouping. It is a major contention that the organiza­
tion has never surmounted these two distinct and vital 
misj udgments.
The United States serves as the chief elite of the 
Dominant System. (In the Global-Subordinate Systems, the 
Dominant System is classified in the Bipolar sense.)
Because of its superior military might (in nuclear capa­
bility, manpower, and technology) the United States found 
itself as the seemingly unquestioned leader of what was then 
termed the "Free World." The aftermath of the war saw both 
Britain and France prostrate from the expenditure of resources 
to gain victory. Only the Soviet Union stood as a potential 
challenger to American leadership. With startling sudden­
ness political developments occurred that took the shape of 
a confrontation between East and West blocs:
a. The establishment of Communist governments in East 
Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary,
Yugoslavia ;
b. Soviet pressure in Iran;
c. The Berlin blockade; and
d. "Sovietization" of the Czech government.
American response was quick and was launched by the
now famous Truman Doctrine. The Marshall Plan, which was 
designed to rehabilitate the European economy, quickly 
followed. Under General Lucious Clay, the Berlin airlift 
soon blunted the blockade that had been imposed. American 
pressure, plus Iranian adroitness, facilitated a Russian
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withdrawal from the northern territories of Iran. And the 
final reaction to the problems of the East was the estab­
lishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in which 
an attack on one was considered an attack upon all. The 
counter-reaction to this move was the creation of the Warsaw 
Pact on May 14, 1 9 5 5.23
These events gave impetus to the creation of the 
Bipolarity (or Dominant System) that has since dominated 
the international scene. This does not mean that Bipolarity 
was a result of these political happenings. Bipolarity had 
as its cause many deeper roots, of which the political 
occurrences were merely symptomatic, or manifestations, of 
underlying forces. A discussion of causal factors in the 
creation of Bipolarity would be the subject for a paper in 
itself. Pertinent to the present problem is the fact that 
Bipolarity was established, hence creating some of the 
conditions that are operative today.
It is a premise here that because of the total 
resource capabilities of Britain and France (both
2 Warsaw Pact members are : Albania, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and 
the Soviet Union.
2^R. N. Rosecrance, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and 
the Future," International Politics: Introductory Readings,
ed. George S. Masannat and^GiIbert Abcariah TNew York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970), pp. 212-213. See also 
Stoessinger, op. cit., p. 175. For further discussion, 
see Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 335-337, and Organski, op. 
cit. , pp. 364-367.
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member-units of the West European System) that these nations 
act as elite lieutenants^^ in relation to SEATO. They are 
in a "superior" position to that of other members of the 
organization who would be classified as mere members, or 
client units. Another distinction that would further remove 
Britain and France from the role of clients within the SEATO 
framework is their geographic position. Theoretically, 
because of their total removal from the defined territorial 
area that comes under SEATO protection, they can only con­
tribute some form of allocated resources rather than receive 
some type of reward function.
The Subordinate Systems of West Europe and America 
are antecedent to those of West Africa, Middle Eastern, and 
Southern Asia. In addition they normally have deeper roots 
through their contiguity than does the Dominant System, or 
sub-systems, which for the most part are more subject to 
variables in their creation. This does not mean that con­
tiguity is a prime factor in the creation of a Subordinate 
System. The great number of wars in Europe, for example, 
argue against that. However, the factor of contiguity in 
association with ethnoculturism can lend a force of 
equilibrium that will more clearly define an area such as 
a Subordinate System.
9 SEtzioni, op. cit., pp. 45, 329. Here the term 
"elite lieutenant" is substituted for "member-elite" with 
essentially the same meaning as the author uses. It is 
felt that the term "lieutenant" will more clearly mark the 
distinguishing feature of levels.
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The West African, Middle Eastern, and Southern 
Asian Subordinate Systems in relation to their potential 
are still in an embryonic stage, due not only to the compara­
tive newness of their formation but also to the fact that 
the majority of the under-developed and developing nations 
in the world (micro and otherwise) are located in these 
three systems.
Considerations for this paper deal mainly with the 
Dominant, West European, and Southern Asian Systems with the 
SEATO units being grouped accordingly:
DOMINANT SYSTEM 
United States
WEST EUROPEAN SOUTHERN ASIA
United Kingdom Pakistan
France Thailand
Philippines
(Members of the Global System, Australia, and New 
Zealand do not fit into a definable Subordinate 
System as yet.)
World War II (as any other major conflagration) left 
its indelible scar upon the levels of European society. By 
far the greatest political effect that the war had was a 
shifting of the center of balance of international political 
decision-making away from the European capitols to Washing­
ton and Moscow. While this had a tendency to diminish the
^^An important element in consideration of these new 
systems is that they are the product of colonialism that has 
just been cast off. Political Scientists will have much to 
work with in charting the progress of these many and varied 
states and the eventual systems that they gravitate toward.
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power of the E u r o p e a n s i t  has in no way diminished the 
West European System from ranking much higher than the 
other subordinate systems in terms of power resource.
The history of Europe has been the story of a 
struggle for primacy on the continent. There are a multi­
tude of reasons for struggles by some and passiveness by 
others. Resource capabilities, ambitions, both national 
and personal, have played their role in shaping the moves 
that the various nations have made. To the surprise of 
noone, some form of this struggle is still taking place on 
the continent, but now it is more economical than political.
For example, the colonial empires of Britain and 
France served as one point of rivalry between these two 
states. Now that they no longer control vast empires, their 
rivalry must now be on the European continent. This took 
form with the European Economic Community (EEC) created 
January 1, 195 8, consisting of Belgium, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany. Such a 
"union" of European states, being exclusive, meant that here 
was a potential economic force that must be matched or at
^^In this sense, Europe is meant as the major 
countries of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany who 
had previously dominated the continent for such a long 
period. (This may be somewhat of a contradiction to Henry 
Kissinger; I include Germany. While it may not have all 
of the attributes or determinants of a "Great Power," it 
nonetheless was a powerful political factor that had to be, 
and still has to be, considered.)
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least checked, for the vital area of trade and general 
economy is of utmost concern to any modern power.
Under the leadership of Britain, the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) was created on January 4, 1960, in 
response to the "Common Market." EFTA (or "the outer 
seven") consists of Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
While it may be true that these two sub-systems are 
rivals of each other, it does not lessen the structure or 
diminish the West European Subordinate System. But it does 
point up the rivalry that exists.
The Southern Asia Subordinate System consists of 
Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Nepal, North Vietnam, Pakistan, the Philippines, South 
Vietnam, and Thailand.^ ̂ For geographical and political 
reasons, mainland China is omitted from this subcontinent 
archipelago description.
The area and unit membership of this System are 
extremely important to SEATO if only for the reason that the 
defined territorial limits of the organization are located 
within this area.
Diversity of background was a distinct yet underly­
ing factor at Manila. In a broad sense, here was a combin­
ing of elements of two Subordinate Systems, a Dominant 
System, and elements close to a Subordinate System. The
^^Brecher, op. cit., p. 157.
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United States represents the Dominant System. Britain and 
France are members of the West European System, as well as 
being client units of the Dominant System. Pakistan, the 
Philippines, and Thailand belong to the Southern Asia 
System, while Australia and New Zealand, belonging to no 
system, are attached to the Southern Asia System geographi­
cally, while culturally, ethnically, and economically still 
attempting to retain ties with the West European System.
Territorial contiguity need not be a critical factor 
in determining the success or failure of any type of multi­
state organization. However, when dis-contiguity is added 
to other determinants which, for the most part, are hetero­
geneous rather than homogeneous, it can then be anticipated 
that such an organizational formation has serious problems 
to cope with.
Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines form part 
of SEATO. Both Pakistan and the Philippines gained their 
freedom after having had some form of colonial past. 
Thailand, on the other hand, is the only Southern Asian 
state never to have suffered colonial domination.
Territorially, and from the standpoint of popula­
tion, Pakistan is the largest of the three units of the 
Subordinate System. Notwithstanding this fact, Pakistan 
suffers from tremendous problems in its nation-building 
process, that in certain aspects, places it behind its 
smaller counterparts. Karl W. Deutsch ranks Pakistan sixth, 
the Philippines 17th, and Thailand 19th in a rank order of
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what he terms human needs. In his rank order of potential 
power, he ranks Pakistan 2 7th, with the Philippines follow­
ing in 3 8th, and Thailand, 45th. His ranking in the 
indicator used for human welfare finds the Philippines 87th, 
Thailand 93rd, and Pakistan 1 0 6 t h . T h e s e ,  of course, are 
not the only indices in any nation-building process, but 
they do serve as an indicator of some of the problems that 
go into that process.
The newness of Pakistan as a nation is not the least 
of the problems that are pertinent here. Pakistan, like 
India, gained its independence (partition in 1947) on a 
mainly religious basis. (Pakistan is predominantly Moslem; 
India is mostly Hindu.)
The division of the sub-continent into the states of 
Pakistan and India was bloody at the onset, and the animos­
ity engendered from this traumatic birth continues. The 
latest manifestation of this was the 1965 Indo-Pakistani 
clash in the Jammu-Kashmir dispute. Peculiar to the general 
nation-state system is the example of Pakistan being geo­
graphically split. The economic-communication network in 
a developing country is a problem, but it is immensely 
compounded when there is a geographic barrier placed in 
the way. It is further compounded when the political
Karl W. Deutsch, op. cit., pp. 252-270.
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factors of non-cooperation of the geographic barrier 
(India) are added. 0̂
Adding to the weighty problems of Pakistan is the 
internal schism of the Bengali, or East Pakistan area. 
Whether or not an inability to cope with the problem was a 
factor in Ayub Khan's decision to step down is at this 
point conjectural. But this factor must be taken into 
consideration when making an assessment of the internal 
political makeup of today’s Pakistan.
Thailand, like Pakistan, is a contiguous part of the 
Asian mainland. Unlike Pakistan, however, Thailand has had 
a long history of nationhood and no colonial domination.
Politically, Thailand is still in a transitory 
period. The coup in 19 32 removed the absolutism of the 
Royal family. Since that time, various factions of the 
military oligarchy have ruled Thailand, the latest being 
headed by Field Marshal Thanon Kittikachom (Prime Minister)
^^In population, Pakistan is outnumbered on an 
approximate 4 to 1 ratio with India. See Khalid B. Sayeed, 
The Political System of Pakistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Co. , 196 7), pp. l85'-2'll. See also Norman D. Palmer and 
Howard C. Perkins, International Relations: The World
Community in Transition (3rd ed.; Boston; Sougîïton Mifflin, 
19 69) , p7 52.
^^The general concept for the "division of labor" 
is a good example here in Pakistan, for one of the chief 
criticisms of Rawalpindi by the East Pakistani is that they 
are being exploited by the West Pakistani. See Deutsch, 
op. cit., p . 30.
32ihailand during World War II did have a form of 
Japanese occupation during the Pridi regime. A measure of 
autonomy was retained during this period.
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King Bhumiphol Adulyadej, of the House of Chakri, is
q qthe ninth monarch to ascend the throne. The Royal House 
is a recognized symbol of unity in this kingdom. The pres­
ent King and his wife, through their Westernized upbringing 
and subsequent trips throughout the world, have helped 
considerably in popularizing Thailand. Internally, the 
Royal family has also been much more involved with the Thai 
public than had previously been the case.
The Thais, though able to maintain their indepen­
dence through the general period of European colonialism in
t%e eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, nevertheless have 
/
had conflict on a more local basis. There have been wars
with the neighboring Burmese, Lao, and Khmers (Cambodians)
over the centuries. Boundary shifts and animosity have been
3 Uthe results which still persist today.
The Philippines, since the close of World War II and 
the gaining of independence from the United States, have 
been in a constant state of nation-building. The United
3 3King Bhumiphol became King following the strange 
shooting death of his brother. King Ananda Mahidol, in June, 
1946. The Coronation was held in May 5, 1950. Thailand: 
Facts and Figures (Bangkok, Thailand: Department of Techni­
cal and Economic Cooperation, 198 7). See also Valentin Chu, 
Thailand Today (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1968). Informa­
tion was also supplied in several conversations with the 
Thai Ambassador to the United States, H. E. Bunchana 
Atthakor.
3‘+"Thailand: Holder of the Kingdom, Strength of the
Land,*’ Time, May 2 7, 1966 , pp. 2 8-34. See also ” Thailand :
A Fighting Ally for U.S. in Asia," U.S. News S World Report, 
February 27, 196 7, pp. 46-4 8.
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States, like Britain, had been a "gentle" master as regards 
building up the island-nation to the time when it would 
receive its freedom. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the 
Philippines has chronic economic problems that bring with it 
political overtones. The Philippines, even though it does 
enjoy a high standard of living in comparison with other 
Asian states, still remains in the class of a "developing" 
nation.
Philippine politics, mercurial at best, chaotic 
otherwise, is a product of the same socio-political system 
that it must stabilize in order to bring some kind of 
solution to the vast economic problems which face the 
country. The prevalence of a high incidence of graft and 
corruption on both the governmental and non-governmental 
levels does not lend itself to needed reforms which must 
come if stability (at least on the political level) is to 
come about.
The Philippines, like Thailand, and Pakistan, are 
in a transitional stage (in the case of Pakistan and the 
Philippines, they must, almost, be categorized as developing 
nations). There are a multitude of internal problems
S^Alden Cutshall, The Philippines: Nation of
Islands (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand,1964), pp. 46-5 0 ,
68-9Û. See also George S. Taylor, The Philippines and the 
United States: Problems of Partnership (New York: Prederick 
ÂI Praeger, 19 64), pp. 134-14^. Carlos P. Romulo, Crusade 
in Asia: Philippine Victory (New York: John Day,19 55),
pp. 60, 91-93, 201-205, 232, 2 34. Carlos P. Romulo, I 
Walked With Heroes (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 
1961), pp. 95, 322-324.
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besetting these nations, which when weighed against external 
demands of other powers often affect the decision that these 
nations make in regard to those demands. Therefore, careful 
attention should be given to these internal political 
forces.
If a failure on the part of American diplomats to 
recognize these problems was not a factor in the formative 
stage of SEATO, then, certainly, it has become one now. 
Failure now, on the part of American diplomats, to alter 
American hopes as regards SEATO in light of these problems, 
will do further damage to that body.
Whenever states come together to fashion some type 
of unifying force, be it an alliance, pact, treaty, or 
understanding, prerequisites for the success of such a 
venture dictate that certain minimal conditions should be 
met. Usually there are at least four implicit factors.
First is the unifying or common purpose factor. Some form 
of credible or tangible evidence of benefit should be 
available to the intended units. A problem should be 
clearly recognizable and accepted as such on the part of 
all the units. Additionally within this acceptance by the 
member units is the willingness to contribute an individual 
allocation of resources to meet the agreed-upon goals of 
such a force. (The individual unit believes that there will 
be no conflict or interference with previously committed
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internal and/or external functions.) The Second factor 
is the identive one Ĝ which includes cultural as well as 
ideological patterns of similarity. The third is the factor 
of resource development and availability.^^ The fourth 
factor is the promise of rewards. Any grouping or amalga­
mation must have with it some sort of incentive or reward 
function that will fulfill the expectancy of any single 
unit. This can take the form of a number of results, be 
they material or non-material.
The situation studies following are intended to show 
that, in particular, reward functions did not materialize in 
a number of instances, systems being in conflict, resource 
development on the part of some of the member-units was not 
activated or put to good use; and to a lesser, but still 
important degree, the recognizable problem that should have 
united all member units (military and political threat) was 
not in itself fully accepted by all members of the body.
There are three situational studies used in this 
paper to demonstrate the premise of the thesis. These are 
political events which occurred and had direct relationships
^^Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification (New York : 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1965), p. 3T. This is 
close to his usage though not as broad in meaning. Almond 
and Coleman, op. cit., p. 33. The term identive would have 
close association with the idea of interest articulation.
^^This is more socio-economic oriented, including 
the vital stage of technological/industrial development, 
i.e., material/mineral availability, a definite managerial 
competency sector, facilities for basic research, some 
degree of wealth.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
37
with various members of SEATO. They are also occurrences 
which, by their very nature, had profound effects on 
internal processes of those member-units and, in the opinion 
of the author, an adverse effect.
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Chapter 2 
SUEZ CRISIS
The Suez crisis took place two years after the 
formation of SEATO. Its location was thousands of miles 
distant from the Treaty territory, yet is important in the 
study of SEATO in that it involved the three elites of 
SEATO— Britain, France, and the United States. It involved, 
in other terms, a "conflict" between the Dominant System 
and units of a Subordinate System, and to a lesser degree 
another sub-system--NATO.
While the leadership in the United States was the 
same at the time of Suez as when SEATO was formed, in 
Britain, the then Foreign Secretary under Winston Churchill 
was now the Prime Minister; and in France, Guy Mollet, a 
Minister to Mendes-France, was now Premier. Relatively, 
then, the same participants were involved.
There were divided interests. Britain saw the 
takeover of Suez by Nasser as a direct threat, both economi­
cally and politically. The French saw Nasser’s action as a 
further threat to Algeria, its remaining colony in North 
Africa. The United States, on the other hand, viewed the 
reactions of their allies as endangering the U.S. policy 
of bettering relations with the Arab states. (Arab feeling
38
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against the United States in view of withdrawal of promised 
aid in building the High Aswan Dam was strong.) Not at any 
time since the formation of SEATO or afterward had such an 
issue so openly split the three elite states.
At this time also the beginnings of British with­
drawal in the area of Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore 
was making itself felt. In 19 51, the ANZUS Pact was con­
cluded between Australia, New Zealand and the United States 
with the British left out completely.
In 1956, the British saw to their dismay the United 
States acting in a manner that they perceived to be quite 
opposite to their own basic national interest, the safe­
guarding of the once regarded "Imperial Lifeline."
Karl Deutsch's point on the formation of foreign 
policy certainly applied to the British at this time. He 
states that "The foreign policy of every country deals first 
with the preservation of its independence and security, and 
second with the pursuit and protection of its economic 
interests (particularly those of its most influential 
interest groups).
By 19 51, Britain had given up nearly all vestiges of 
the colonialist trappings of imperialism. Only a few out­
posts of Crown Colonies were left of that former, glorious 
Empire that in the Nineteenth Century caused the remark:
iKarl W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International 
Relations (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 
1968), p. 87.
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"We hold a Vaster Empire than has been."^ That which 
remained of what had been the Empire was now transformed 
into the larger and more autonomous Commonwealth or had 
broken off into independent nations cut off from all ties 
to the former mother country.
This reduction of empire, irresistible as it may 
have been what with the pressure of peoples for an inde­
pendent status, had not come about without objections on 
the part of the British hierarchy^ or a reduction in 
British power and prestige on the world scene. Empires 
often have the attribute of "dying hard," and it was, 
perhaps, no different with the British Empire than it had 
been with other empires. Whether viewed from the point 
of vested industrial interests in Britain, that saw the 
units of the Empire as a steady source of materials and 
profit, or in a purely nostalgic sense, those "elites"
^Statement on a Canadian stamp of 189 8 in reference 
to the British Empire.
^Winston Churchill on one occasion remarked that 
"I did not become the King's First Minister to see the 
dissolution of the Empire." John Bartlett, Familiar 
Quotations (14th ed. ; Boston: Little, Brown ê Co., 196 8), 
p. 9T4.
^While it is recognized that those peoples who 
severed ties as colonies did so mostly under peaceful 
conditions, as opposed to the French example of Algeria 
and Indo-China, the point is valid that a considerable 
amount of British public opinion did not wish to see this 
change come about.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
41
or leaders of the government viewed this cutting of ties 
with great reluctance.^
It should not he surprising, therefore, that Suez, 
the very "symbol" of British power and prestige in their 
prime, should produce this strong reaction on the part of 
the British elite segment. The nationalization of the Canal 
by Egyptian President Camel Abdel Nasser was anathema to 
Anthony Eden. It should never be forgotten that Eden took 
great pride in having been a participant in the signing of 
the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1 9 36 .̂
Suez had for years represented the "Imperial life­
line" to British holdings in the Far East, especially 
India, and much British blood had been shed in the defense 
of the Suez Canal. Aden, on the Southern entryway to Suez, 
still remained a link to the past, while the oil-rich Arab 
principalities of Q 'tar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the Trucial 
states represented an investment of millions of pounds to 
British interests, and had to be protected.
The relationship of Suez to the British might be 
equated to Panama's relationship to the United States. It 
is conjectural what the United States reaction would be if 
there should be a threat to the Panama Canal. Dulles and 
Eisenhower, therefore, should have been more perceptive in
^A majority of lands and peoples dissolved ties with 
the Crown under the Labor Government of Clement Attlee.
^Eden, op. cit., p. 24 8.
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anticipating that the British would not be in any sort of a 
bargaining mood while Suez was at stake. Unless the action 
were pro-British anything Dulles and Eisenhower did, however 
much in the name of "peace,” would continue to widen the 
gulf between the leaders of the two countries.
The American view concerning the growing tension of 
Suez was conveyed in several letters that President Eisen­
hower forwarded to Prime Minister Eden:
From the moment that Nasser announced nationalization 
of the Suez Canal Company, my thoughts have been con­
stantly with you. Grave problems are placed before 
both our governments, although for each of us they 
naturally differ in type and character. Until this 
morning, I was happy to feel that we were approaching 
decisions as to applicable procedures somewhat along 
parallel lines, even though there were, as would be 
expected, important differences as to details. But 
early this morning I received the messages, communi­
cated to me through Murphy from you and Harold Mac­
millan, telling me on a most secret basis of your 
decision to employ force without delay or attempting 
any immediate and less drastic steps. . . . For my 
part, I cannot over-emphasize the strength of my 
conviction that some method must be attempted before 
action such as you contemplate should be undertaken.
. . . I have given you my own personal conviction, 
as well as that of my associates, as to the unwisdom 
even of contemplating the use of military force at 
this moment.7
Momentous political developments were taking shape during 
that year. The Suez Crisis, the Hungarian uprising and the 
American Presidential election were all to fall approxi­
mately at the same time period and were to have their 
global ramifications. Eisenhower had informed Eden of his
^Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace 1956-1961 
(Garden City: Doubleday S Company, Inc., 196 5), p . 6T4.
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reservations on the use of force, and his general lack of 
enthusiasm for any precipitate British action which he felt
o
would not be backed by American public opinion.
Further developments in the crisis caused Eisenhower
to write again to Eden:
I am afraid, Anthony, that from this point onward our 
views on this situation will diverge. As to the use 
of force or the threat of force at this juncture, I 
continue to feel as I expressed myself in the letter 
Foster carried to you some two weeks ago. Even now 
military preparations and civilian evacuation exposed 
to public view seem to be solidifying support for 
Nasser which has been shaky in many important quarters.
I regard it as indispensible that if we are to proceed 
solidly together to the solution of this problem, 
public opinion in our several countries must be over­
whelming in its support. I must tell you frankly that 
American public opinion flatly rejects the thought of
using force, particularly when it does not seem that
every possible peaceful means of protecting our vital 
interests have been exhausted without result. More­
over, I gravely doubt we could here secure Congressional 
authority even for lesser support measures for which
you might have to look to us.
I really do not see how a successful result could be 
achieved by forcible means. The use of force would, 
it seems to me, vastly increase the area of jeopardy.
This letter was dated September 2, 1956, while the 
date of the former letter was July 21, 1956. There was 
increased diplomatic activity. Dulles, on orders from 
Eisenhower, journeyed to London and Geneva to convey to the 
allies the American position. Eisenhower in a letter of
Bibid.
9%bid., p. 667. 
lOSeal, op. cit., pp. 265-271.
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September 8, 1956, was again to reinforce Dulles by direct
communication to Eden:
Whenever, on any international question, I find myself 
differing even slightly from you, I feel a deep compul­
sion to re-examine my position instantly and carefully. 
But permit me to suggest that when you use phrases in 
connection with the Suez Affair, like "ignoble end to 
our long history" in describing the possible future of 
your great country, you are making of Nasser a much more 
important figure than he is.
We have a grave problem confronting us in Nasser’s 
reckless adventure with the Canal, and I do not differ 
from you in your estimate of his intentions and pur­
poses. The place where we apparently do not agree is
on the probable effects in the Arab world of the various
possible reactions by the Western World. . . . H
A later communication, on October 30, 1956, more
clearly defined the gulf that existed between the American
position and that of Britain and France:
When on Monday actual military moves began, we quickly 
decided that the matter had to go immediately to the
United Nations, in view of our Agreement of May, 1950,
subscribed to by our three governments.
Last evening our Ambassador to the United Nations met 
with your Ambassador, Pierson Dixon, to request him to 
join us in presenting the case to the United Nations 
this morning. We were astonished to find that he was 
completely unsympathetic, stating frankly that his 
government would not agree to any action whatsoever to 
be taken against Israel. He further argued that the 
tri-partite statement of May, 1950, was ancient history 
and without current validity.
Without arguing the point as to whether or not the 
tri-partite statement is or should be outmoded, I feel 
very seriously that whenever any agreement or pact of 
this kind is in spirit renounced by one of its
^^Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 669.
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signatories, it is only fair that the other 
signatories should be notified. . .
Besides the distinct differences that each of the 
Allied leaders felt concerning the situation, there also 
existed a difference in what each of them felt was the 
actual reasons for the stand that they took,^^ At least 
one thing was clear: there was not going to be any recog­
nition by the United States of the tremendous stakes that 
the British felt were involved with Suez. It was a form 
of "Pax Americana" coming into the open.
The Suez crisis was muddied. Of that there can be 
no doubt. If one views the proceedings strictly from the 
point of Anglo-American cooperation on the world scene, 
it was a disaster. However, another element, the personal 
relationships of the individuals involved, should be 
examined. There was a decided animosity between Dulles 
and Eden; this even took the form of the British leaders
l^Emmet John Hughes, The Ordeal of Power (New York: 
Atheneum, 196 3), pp. 212-217. Hughes records Eisenhower 
making several remarks concerning the allied powers :
". . . ‘Damn it, the French, they’re just egging the 
Israeli on— hoping somehow to get out of their own North 
African troubles. Damn it, they sat right there in those 
chairs three years ago, and we tried to tell them they 
would repeat Indochina all over again in North Africa. And 
they said, "Oh, no I That's part of metropolitan France 
And all that damn nonsense. . . . (of British action) I 
just can't believe it, . . . 1  can't believe they would be 
so stupid as to invite on themselves all the Arab hostility 
to Israel. . . . (in terms of British relations with Wash­
ington) Are they going to dare us— dare us— to defend the 
Tri-partite declaration?'"
13Ibid., p. 219 .
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suggesting to Washington that Dulles not be appointed 
Secretary of State.
Sometimes there is a fine line that separates the 
"objectivity" of policy making from the personalities of 
those involved in making the decisions. While it would be 
unwise to state that the "seeming" uncooperative attitude 
on the part of American leaders was due to this form of 
personality conflict, this clash of minds should be kept in 
focus as events continued.
How the British felt had been indicated by Eden on
as early an occasion as a speech in January, 1952, delivered
at Columbia University:
The American and British people should each understand 
the strong points in the other’s national character.
If you drive a nation to adopt procedures which run 
counter to its instincts, you weaken and may destroy 
the motive force of its actions. This is something 
that you would not do— to an ally on whose effective 
cooperation we depend. . . .1^
Eden, not without self vanity, had taken over the 
Prime Ministership at a time when his party was being sub­
jected to continual criticism from the Laborites (the Tories 
had defeated the Labor Government four years previously). 
Following the footsteps of so giant a British leader as 
Churchill was no easy task for anyone. In addition, he was 
facing strong criticism from elements within his own party 
for "appeasement."1^
1‘̂Northedge , op. cit. , p. 19 0.
15Anthony Sampson, Macmillan: A Study in Ambiguity
(Harmon dsworth, England: C. JNiicholls & Company, Ltd. 7 l^&ü).
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Eden was to reveal the depth of the differences that 
separated his government from that of the United States in 
his memoirs :
The course of the Suez Canal crisis was decided by the 
American attitude toward it. If the United States 
Government approached this issue in the spirit of an 
ally, they would have done everything in their power, 
short of the use of force, to support the nations whose 
economic security depended upon the freedom of passage 
through the Suez Canal. They would have closely planned 
their policies with their allies and held stoutly to the 
decisions arrived at. They would have insisted on 
restoring international authority in order to insulate 
the canal from the policies of one country. It is now 
clear that this was never the attitude of the United 
States Government. Rather did they try to gain time, 
coast along over difficulties as they arose and impro­
vise policies, each following on the failure of its 
immediate predecessor. None of these was geared to the 
longterm purpose of serving a joint c a u s e . I6
p. 117. "The case of Eden, with some help from hindsight, 
is more explicable. By early 1956, after only a few months 
as Prime Minister, Eden was facing ugly Tory discontent; 
he was accused of weak government by the Daily Telegraph; 
he was infuriating his colleagues with his fussiness and 
interferences; and, more dangerous— in spite of his old 
fame as an anti-appeaser— he was coming under heavy fire 
for appeasing both the Russians (over Indo-China) and the 
Arabs. It was a time heavy with humiliation for the Con­
servative right wing, particularly in the Middle East. The 
arch-enemy was Nasser, who seemed atthat time to many people 
in both parties to be part of a great Russian plot to sweep 
into the Persian Gulf and Africa. Eden was very vulnerable 
to criticism. It was he who had negotiated the 'scuttle'
(as Churchill called it) from the Suez base in 1954— with 
the help of Selwyn Lloyd— and who assured the Tories that 
Nasser could be trusted." See also ^  dispatch, Argus 
Leader (Sioux Falls), August 2, 1956, p. 1. Eden accuses 
Nasser of "broken faith and broken promises."
l^Eden, op. cit., p. 512. See also ^  dispatch, 
Argus Leader (Sioux Falls), August 3, 19 56, p. 1. "Dulles 
flew home from London— hopes that the issue can be settled.
A conference of the states involved is being called in 
about two weeks to discuss the problem." See also AP 
dispatch, Argus Leader (Sioux Falls), August 4, 1 9 5 ^
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If ever a diplomat, statesman, elite, government 
leader gave an example to fit the words of Deutsch in his 
foreign policy description, it was Anthony Eden. Here he 
described his attitude not only toward the leadership in 
the United States, which he felt had turned away from him, 
but also toward the crisis that he felt that his nation 
faced. It was upon this perception that the British 
leadership acted, in concert with French l e a d e r s h i p .
Suez represented then an issue that the British 
considered vital to their national interests. When the 
issue was brought before the Security Council of the United 
Nations, the British used their veto for the first time in 
direct opposition to an American-sponsored resolution.
p. 1. Quoting Dulles: "Some people had advocated immediate
forcible action— such action would have violated UN prin­
ciples, led to the spread of violence and endangered world 
peace."
l^Eden, op. cit., p. 485. ". . . Pineau now
declared that his Government were unanimous in desiring 
urgent and decisive action. The Suez Canal had been built 
by the French. Moreover, the repercussions of Nasser's 
actions touched France closely in another and vital sphere. 
From the first. Pineau emphasized the effects that it would 
have in Algeria and upon the entire French position in North 
Africa. If Egypt were allowed to succeed in grabbing the 
Canal, the Algerian nationalists would take fresh heart.
They would also look to Egypt for backing, which they would 
certainly receive, both in arms and clamor. France could 
not permit this threat to develop. We agreed with 
M. Pineau's forecast and supported his views. . . . "
IBpden, in Full Circle, chronicles the events within 
the UN regarding the Suez crisis. In his description of the 
vote within the Security Council to transfer the subject to 
the General Assembly he declared that the crucial seventh 
vote necessary to pass the resolution was cast by the 
United States. He fails to take into account the fact that
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United States actions seemed to disregard British 
concern over the issue. Where British leadership had felt 
that at worst the American attitude would have been one of 
pained indifference, the actual pressures, diplomatic and 
otherwise, that the Americans used on the British, French, 
and Israelis proved to be a rude shock. Such tactics as 
stipulating a cease-fire on the part of the British prior 
to an American loan to ease the run on the pound sterling 
did not for instance set well. The placement of American 
warships of the Sixth Fleet to act as an "accidental" 
barrier to British and French fleet operations added to the 
overall picture of non-cooperation on the part of the United 
States.
Where the issue is held to be as vital as the Eden 
government viewed it to be, then it is inevitable that the 
American reaction to this affair served to humiliate the 
British and thus strain the relationship that existed 
between the two governments. The same strain was also felt 
by the French, for they perceived that they had just as 
high a stake in the Suez affair as did the British.
Nationalist China (casting a similar vote) might not have 
done so if Britain had not recognized mainland China 
previously.
Sampson, op. cit., pp. 118-124. See also Hugh 
Thomas, Suez (New York: Harper 8 Row, 1966), pp. 144-146.
See also AP dispatch Argus Leader (Sioux Falls), October 31, 
1956, p. 1. The United States Sixth Fleet was helping in 
the evacuation of United States citizens. Units of the 
fleet moved to the Mediterranean ports of Egypt and Israel.
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"Nasserism" was an idea that was beginning to take hold, not 
only in the Middle East, but North Africa as well. Anything 
that stirred Arab nationalism was anathema to the French, 
for nationalism was the very thing that could weaken and 
even destroy their hold on Algeria as well as spelling 
trouble for their economic return to the areas of Lebanon 
and Syria.
In terms of alliances, the Suez crisis produced the 
event of the United States, ally of Great Britain and France 
in NATO and SEATO, working against her own allies to side 
with the raison d'etre of these alliances, the Soviet 
Union.
The more nation-states are involved in external 
interests, i.e., other systems, alliances, etc., the more 
varied or broader must be their scope. Purely nationalistic 
interests serve to narrow one’s room for maneuvering; for 
what one nation perceives to be a necessary goal that must 
be pursued, some other nation may view as something to be 
opposed— it being in conflict with its own perceived inter­
ests. If such a conflict of interest exists, and the two 
or more nations are joined in a system or alliance, then, 
depending on how strong the motivations are for continuing 
these courses, that system or alliance must inevitably 
suffer at the expense of the nationalistic interest.
The Suez Affair cannot be postulated as "the" 
reason for the differences that now separate some of the
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member-units of SEATO. But it is important. Fundamental 
to any of these situational crises is the ever-present 
aspect of how those member-units view the ideological 
conflict between the Dominant System and the "menace" of 
Communist aggression; the "demands" that each Subordinate 
System extracts from its own membership as a "price" for 
primacy within that system, and the ever-present competition 
with each other that some of the member-units find them­
selves in.
The Suez Affair may be viewed in this context.
While the bonds that had bound Britain, France, and the 
United States together for so long a time may not have been 
severed over this quarrel, it nonetheless must be looked at 
in the sense that a gap had been made to which other differ­
ences of opinion and policy could only help widen.
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LAOTIAN CRISIS
The Laotian conflict of 1959-1962 provides further 
insight into these differences that divided the thinking 
of the elites of SEATO. Not only is it important from that 
aspect, it was highly relevant to the whole idea of SEATO, 
for here was a conflict situation existing right in the 
defined Treaty area. It should also be taken into account 
that Laos was in fact a Protocol State, and therefore had 
a direct linkage with SEATO, as well as being geographically 
within the Treaty area.
There was trouble in Laos as the 50’s ended and the 
60’s began. The government in Vientienne was clearly trying 
to prevent a collapse of order in the government-controlled 
portions of the country. The Pathet-Lao was an observable 
entity. North Vietnamese forces were operating in Laotian 
territory and the United States and the Soviet Union once 
again were involved as Superpowers interested in an area 
they each considered vital. In the background Peking, now 
at ideological odds with Moscow, was giving aid to Hanoi.
On March 27, 1961, the SEATO Council of Ministers 
convened the seventh SEATO Council meeting in Bangkok. Its 
communique, issued March 29, 1961, is interesting for what
52
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is said about Laos, but more interesting for what it failed 
to mention.
The resolution contained in the first part of the 
communique (in particular paragraph six) was expressed in 
strong language. Indeed, this resolution, and the communi­
que issued at the special meeting of the Council of 
Ministers in Washington, B.C., September 26, 1959,^ were 
the strongest statements ever issued by the SEATO organi­
zation about a development within its treaty area.
What was not revealed in the communique was the lack 
of unanimity for action within the council. Because of this 
division of opinion, the organization could take no steps.
In particular, timing and/or reluctance on the part of the 
British delegation, headed by Sir Alec Douglas Home, pre­
vented any actional unanimity. Britain, as Co-chairman of 
the previous Geneva Convention (the Geneva Conference of 
April 26, 1954, through July 21, 19 54, the Soviet Union 
being the other Co-chairman), was awaiting a reply from the 
Soviet Union about an appeal to be directed mainly at Hanoi
SEATO," Select Documents on International Affairs: 
No. 8 (Canberra, Australia: Queen’s Printer, Department of 
External Affairs, June, 1966), p. 47. "Considering that the 
situation in Laos is one which might endanger the peace of 
the area, members of SEATO will continue to consult under 
the Manila Pact on measures which should be taken for the 
common defense. In the event of its becoming necessary to 
defend the integrity of Laos against outside intervention, 
SEATO has made preparations so as to be able to act promptly 
within the framework of the Manila Treaty."
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for a cease fire in Laos. As they had earlier stalled 
formation of SEATO until after the Geneva Conference, the 
British once again deferred action that might compromise 
or sabotage the response they hoped to receive from the 
Soviets.
The French, under the delegation leader M. Maurice 
Couve de Murville, Minister of Foreign Affairs, were just 
as resolved not to become involved, fearing entanglement in 
another Indo-China war.^
The American position at this time was far from 
secure. John F. Kennedy had taken over the presidency in 
January, 1961, and was still setting up his administration. 
On April 17, 1961, Cuban refugees (with clandestine American 
help) attempted an ill-fated invasion in the Bay of Pigs 
with the hope of toppling Fidel Castro from power. It 
failed two days after the President made the decision not 
to intervene militarily. Kennedy had inherited a growing 
American concern over Laos from the Eisenhower administra­
tion. Theodore Sorensen recalls: "'Whatever's going to
happen in Laos,' the President-elect said to me in Palm 
Beach, 'an American invasion, a Communist victory or what­
ever, I wish it would happen before we take over and get 
blamed for it.'"^
^Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos : The Politics
of Neutralization (New Yorkl Frederick A. Praeger, 19 6 40, 
p"I 1‘9 5'. Also see Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: 
Harper S Row, 1965), p. 644.
^Ibid., p. 640.
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When one refers to the "Laotian crisis," it is 
almost necessary to ask, "Which one?" Since the ending of 
World War II, Laos had seen almost constant strife, with 
only intermittent periods of peace.
If the strife in Laos can be grouped into phases, 
then the first phase of conflict arose from the French 
attempt to re-impose mastery over its former colonies in 
Indo-China. A period of nine years marked by strife 
followed before the French, bowing to the inevitable, 
withdrew as a colonial power from this part of the world.^
Resistance, in whatever form it takes, can breed 
new groupings and attitudes that are far different from 
those which generated the conflict. This is dependent on 
(1) how homogenous or heterogenous such groups are at the 
beginning, and (2) the point on the "development scale" of 
the various entities or societies. The latter point carries 
the implicit question of the state of advancement of their 
political infrastructures. Resistance can also harden or 
rigidify previously soft or fluid positions. The reaction 
to the attempted French imposition did just this for the 
various peoples in the Indo-China peninsula. Where pre­
viously some sort of higher role than a French protectorate 
or territory might have met political demands, such a 
solution was soon inadequate. When the French, in a
^Results of the 195M- Geneva Conference.
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desperate attempt to forestall calamity, sought such a 
political "incorporation," it was then too late, for the 
nationalist groupings which the resistance had spawned 
wanted nothing less than complete independence. Foremost 
among these nationalist groups was the Vietminh under the 
leadership of Ho Chi Minh.^
In Laos, the three Princes, Souvanna Phouma, 
Souphanouvong, and Boun Oum na Champassak, and the King, 
Sisavang Vong, represented the ruling group. The King, 
however, held little actual power and served mainly in 
the role of a national symbol or unifying figure. Laos, 
although small in population, is far from a homogenous 
society. It is fragmented by ethnic and religious 
divisions.
Racially, the country is composed of Lao, Kha, Meo, 
Black, White, and Red Tais, and to a lesser degree by Moi, 
Thais, Khmers, Mans, and Lolos.® There is a relationship 
between the Lao and the Thais (Siamese) and the Shans of 
Burma. During the past centuries, warfare between the Lao
^D. F. Fleming, op. cit., pp. 661, 667-673. See 
also Bernard S. Morris, International Communism and American 
Policy (New York : Atherton Press, ÏÉ 66), pp. 9 9-10 0 ; and 
Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., pp. 60-78j and Michael 
Field, The Prevailing Wind: Witness in Indo-China (London:
Methuen 8 Company, Ltd., 1965), pp. 36l6 7, 41-42.
pp. 30-32
^Dommen, op. cit., pp. 3-5, and Field, op. cit., 
2 .
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and their neighbors dominated the fortunes of the then 
small Kingdom of Luang Prabang. (Luang Prabang, now the 
Royal capitol of modern-day Laos, is a province and received 
its name from the Buddha which was placed in the main 
temple— "Town of the Golden Buddha").?
The original Kingdom of Lan Xang broke up into the 
smaller kingdoms of Luang Prabang, Vietienne, Champassak, 
Xieng Khousang and lesser states. The kingdoms of Luang 
Prabang, Vietienne, and Champassak survived the feudalistic 
struggle.
In contemporary times, it is the Kingdom of Luang 
Prabang that warred with the Thais and the Vietnamese, and 
to some degree with the Burmese; Vientienne and Champassak 
with the Vietnamese kingdom of Annam; and Champassak with 
the Khmers (Cambodians). The people are divided almost
Ûequally between Buddhism and Animism.
Souvanna Phouma and his half brother Souphanouvong 
represent the Royal House of Vientienne. Boun Oum repre­
sents the Royal House of Champassak. To a large degree, 
the polarizing of the ambitions of Princes Souphanouvong 
and Boun Oum triggered the second phase of the Laotian 
strife. In place of a united front against the French, that 
front was fragmented into the usual trial of several
^Ibid., p . 6. 
^Ibid., pp. 14-15.
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contestants for internal control. It could be said that 
this was the Laos of old in a new setting.
The people in the Indo-China peninsula exhibit great 
complexity and diversity. Quiet and peaceful as the 
Laotians are, it would be a mistake to assume that in the 
latter part of the Twentieth Century the various societies 
with the Lao country and outside of it have plateaued or 
reached any equilibrium. Change is still taking place. It 
was against this background that the locale of Laos was 
brought into the general resistance picture by the Vietminh.^
Ho Chi Minh and General Giap did not achieve the 
final liberation that they had fought for and sought at the 
conference table in Geneva in 1954. With Ngo Dinh Diem 
(former Premier, and then President of South Vietnam) con­
solidating his hold within South Vietnam, it was inevitable 
that pressure would be placed on the Saigon regime. To meet 
logistical requirements it was necessary that the narrow 
confines of the seventeenth parallel be broached. The 
easiest way to accomplish this was to go westward into the 
central regions of Laos. The Ho Chi Minh Trail was created 
to funnel supplies and men s o u t h w a r d . T h e  Pathet-Lao,
9ln this sense the term "Vietminh" is used to de­
note all of the followers of Ho Chi Minh and all movements 
within the general national liberation organization.
I'^Rober Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of 
Foreign Policy in the Administration of John P. Kennedy 
(Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1967), pp. 119-120. 
And see Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, op. cit., p. 318.
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supported by both regulars and irregulars from North 
Vietnam, used the Northern Lao territories of Phong Saly 
and Sam Neua as a grouping or staging area. From here it 
was fairly simple to move westward and southward against 
Royalist forces.
While the existence and use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail 
was clearly a breach of the Geneva accords, neither Laos, 
South Vietnam, nor the United States (after August 4, 1964) 
ever used this violation as a pretext to make a military 
movement against it. Only movements in the north of Laos 
occasioned the recognition that violations of the Geneva 
accords were taking place against the Royalist regime. 
Military recognition was also given to the fact that should 
the combined forces of the Pathet-Lao and the North Viet­
namese so choose, they could very easily overrun all of 
Laos.
Souphanouvong is generally credited with being the 
leader of the Pathet-Lao. While the Pathet-Lao are gener­
ally Lao people, it was the foreign addition of the North 
Vietnamese's far superior forces that triggered the denun­
ciations from Vietienne.
In trying to reach some accommodations with all 
factions,agreements were worked out whereby the various
llHilsman, op. cit. , p. 91. i 2 ^  p. 131.
^ % e r e , for the sake of simplicity (and also in 
accordance with most other writers), Souphanouvong and the 
Pathet-Lao are labeled "leftist," Souvanna Phouma, "neutral­
ist," and Boun Oum and his followers, "rightist."
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ministries of the Government were divided among the rival 
parties. Usually this would work for a period of time and 
then break down when one rival felt he did not have a key 
ministry. Then instability would occur with the jockeying 
of the various military sides. Territory would be fought 
over. In the northern area of Laos this would usually be 
for the strategic Plaines de Jares.^^
For two reasons this was an intolerable situation. 
First, if pro-Communist forces were to take over Laos, then 
the Communist frontier would be moved right to the boundary 
of Thailand. This the Thais were determined would not 
ha p pen.Secondly, a chain-reaction effect was starting 
to make itself felt. With the increased tempo of military 
activity in South Vietnam by Ho Chi Minh and the increasing 
activity of forces in Northern Laos, the United States was 
beginning to take more of an interest in the area. Both the 
Soviet Union and Red China were supporting Hanoi in its bid 
to "drive the imperialists out." However, the Soviet Union 
and Red China had now come to ideological loggerheads, and 
each was trying to outdo the other in its support of
A? dispatch, Argus Leader (Sioux Falls), January 2, 
1961, p. 1. ". . . Boun Oum announces that Communist forces
advanced on Laos' strategic plains--creating a threat to 
the Royal seat at Luang Prabang and the Administrative 
capital."
l^Bangkok dispatch, Manchester Guardian, December 29, 
1960, p. 5, col. 2.
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national liberation fronts. It was a battle to see who 
would emerge as the leader of the Communist forces in the 
world. Such a struggle inevitably led to increased Russian 
support of Pathet-Lao forces. This then represented a 
threat to the United States, which, since 19 51, had mutual 
defense arrangements with the protocol states.
The United States under the Eisenhower administra­
tion had invested much money and aid in Laos. The situa­
tion in Laos was deteriorating militarily, and with increased 
pressure from the Thais, the United States made several 
warnings concerning United States interest in the continued 
sovereignty of Laos. The activity of the Pathet-Lao and 
its supporters had been on the increase since 1959. Now, 
with Washington, Moscow, and Peking involved also, the 
situation quickly spread into an international rather than 
a local situation.
Rightist forces under Prince Boun Oum succeeded in 
gaining control of the government. Since they represented 
the anti-Communist faction of the country. United States
^®The American Almanac: 19 70 (New York: Grosset S
Dunlap, 19 70 ), p . 791.
^^AP dispatch, John Hightower, Argus Leader (Sioux 
Falls), January 1, 1961, p. 1. "A statement approved by 
President Eisenhower sharply warned Red China and North 
Vietnam against armed intervention in Laos. . . . The United 
States is committed by Treaty to help meet the common dan­
ger ’in event of aggression in Southeast Asia.'" See also 
U.S. Superintendent of Documents, Public Papers of the Presi­
dents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower 196Q-l96l~
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 196l),
pp. 626, 641.
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support gravitated toward their side. The fact that Boun 
Oum did not have the internal support militarily and 
politically to stay in power necessitated a later shift in 
American p o l i c y . T h i s  did not detract from the fact that 
the Pathet-Lao and its supporters were making increasing 
incursions into what was considered to be government- 
controlled territories. The result was a call from the 
United States to the SEATO powers.
The British reaction to the Laotian crisis was to 
re-establish its neutral stance and to seek a cease fire 
that would hopefully halt further i n c u r s i o n s . 20
i^There was considerable political fluctuation, 
including the "revolt" of Captain, later Colonel, Kong Lae. 
This followed the period of instability of Prince Somsanith.
^^AP dispatch, Argus Leader (Sioux Falls), Janu­
ary 2, 1961, p. 1. "In another diplomatic step the United 
States called for a meeting of the 8-nation South East Asia 
Treaty Organization Council to discuss the crisis. The 
Council meets in Bangkok, Thailand and instructions for the 
meeting went to U. Alexis Johnson, American envoy there. The 
State Department also said Sunday 'We have further instructed 
our Ambassadors to all SEATO capitals to inform their gov­
ernments to which they are accredited of these new develop­
ments in Laos and to explain the United States view that 
these actions warrant considerations by the SEATO Council.
We have begun preliminary consultations with some of our 
allies here in Washington.' Under Secretary of State Liv­
ingston Merchant conferred with British Ambassador 
Sir Harold Caccia and with Claude Lebel, the ranking 
French diplomat there."
2^ManChester Guardian, December 22, 1960, p. 3, 
col. 4 g pi 5̂  col. Ti "On Monday the Foreign Secretary and 
Lord Privy Seal made it clear that it was the British Gov­
ernment's hope that a broadly based government could be 
formed in Laos including all political leaders ready to 
cooperate. The British Ambassador was instructed to convey 
this view to Prince Boun Oum."
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The members of SEATO received few answers to ques­
tions of United States intentions at this time, for the 
Kennedy administration was just taking over after eight 
years of the Eisenhower administration. It was not really 
known just what moves the new President would make, nor, 
at the beginning of the year, who his Secretary of State 
would be. There would be further time needed for the new 
President to get used to his presidency. At one time during 
the early part of the Kennedy administration, it was sug­
gested that a moratorium of six months be asked of the 
Soviets so that the new President could adjust to the new 
situation.However, political movements do not wait on 
American Presidents and situations had to be reviewed and 
decisions made.
Boun Oum's position deteriorated as his military 
forces, under the leadership of General Phoumi Nosovan, fell 
back steadily under the pressure of Pathet-Lao and North 
Vietnamese forces. At one time these forces were reported 
a mere twenty-two miles from the Royal capitol of Luang 
Prabang. The American alignment with Boun Oum was in 
jeopardy.
Pathet-Lao and North Vietnamese forces were being 
openly supplied by Soviet air-lifted supplies in the Sara 
Neua-Plaines de Jares-Phong Saly area, while American
21Sorensen, op. cit., pp. 291-292.
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air-lifted supplies were reaching the Laotians in the 
Southern area. The commitment of both the United States 
and the Soviet Union in Laos was soon to become obvious to 
all.
President Kennedy, on March 23, 1961, four days
before the opening of the SEATO meeting in Bangkok, held a
news conference in Washington, where he outlined his
Laotian position. In the conference he made public his
reliance on the SEATO organization:
SEATO, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization— was 
organized in 1954, with strong leadership from our 
last administration, and all members of SEATO have 
undertaken special treaty responsibilities towards 
an aggression in Laos.
No one should doubt our resolution on this point.
We are faced with a clear and one-sided threat of a 
change in the internationally agreed upon position 
of Laos. This threat runs counter to the will of 
the Laotian people, who wish only to be independent 
and neutral. It is posed rather by the military 
operations of internal dissident elements directed 
from outside the country. This is what must end if 
peace is to be achieved in South East A s i a . 22
That reliance, as it turned out, was not met to the fullest
degree by the entire membership of SEATO.
Whereas the United States had been placing its
9 3support behind the "legal" government of Prince Boun Oum,
2 2u.S. Superintendent of Documents, Public Papers of 
the Presidents of the United States : John FT Kennedy, 196r~
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 214,
^^In his takeover of power, Boun Oum and General 
Nosavan had ousted Kong Lae, who then went over to Prince 
Souphanouvong and his followers. Pressure was placed on
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Britain and France had given at least tacit support to 
Prince Souvanna Phouma, who was now no longer in the country. 
The remaining political leadership was the polarized 
factions of Boun Oum and Souphanouvong. The military for­
tunes of General Phoumi continued to slip, and it was 
becoming increasingly evident that Prince Boun Oum and his 
General could not hold out much longer against the mounting 
pressures of the Pathet-Lao and the North Vietnamese.
To hold as much as they could of Laos for neutral 
territory, the West opted for an international conference 
on Laos after a cease fire had been called for and achieved. 
The Communist powers, to gain more territory and consolidate 
gains already made, held off for as long as possible in 
answering this call for a cease fire.
But the "front" that President Kennedy had tried to 
put forth in his statement of March 2 3 failed to hold. This 
became evident in the language of paragraph four of the 
SEATO Resolution of March 29: "It is believed that these
results ought to be achieved through negotiations and
the King to recognize the Boun Oum regime as the legitimate 
regime, which he did. Just prior to that, Prince Souvanna 
Phouma had tried to form a government of "national unity" 
which would include all political factions. General Nosavan 
would have had the post of the Ministry of Defense, but he 
failed to take up that position. The Boun Oum move followed, 
and Prince Souvanna Phouma left the country for Cambodia.
2‘+Field, op. cit. , pp. 125-126 .
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cannot be hoped for if the present fighting continues.
It was only after this issuance of the SEATO communique that 
the Soviets answered the Aide Mémoire of March 2 3 that the 
British had sent them requesting a cease fire in the name 
of the co-chairman of the previous Geneva Conference.
Divisions had prevailed within SEATO. The United 
States had to shift from the earlier position of energetic­
ally supporting Laos as a pro-Western bastion. Now the 
United States had to back a Laos that would be neutral 
without ties with the West.
Politically, this move was a necessity. To have 
done otherwise would have meant that a unilateral United 
States response, in the form of full military support, would 
be mounted to prevent a complete takeover of Laos by the 
Communists. The new President did not choose to follow this 
course, and an International Conference on Laos was convened 
in Geneva on May 16, 1961.
From a standpoint of SEATO, the "Laotian Crisis" 
served to undermine the very base of the organization.
25sEATO Communique of March 29, 1961, Annex C to 
SCM/61/VT, p. 125.
^^The conference was originally scheduled for 
May 12, but the question of who was to represent Laos from 
the three factions delayed the opening. This conference 
lasted from May, 1961, to July 23, 1962, and subsequent 
events in Laos (the renewal of fighting and violation of 
the cease fire) prompted the United States to exert military 
pressure in the form of the landing of United States Marines 
in Thailand. The troops were a direct warning to the 
Communists.
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While it may have been politically expedient for the 
United States (chief elite of the organization) to change 
its policy regarding Laos, its change triggered two inter­
national effects: (1) it disillusioned some members of
SEATO concerning the continued viability of that organiza­
tion;^"^ and (2) part of the treaty area was in fact nibbled 
away through negotiation from the original area.
^ M̂anchester Guardian, December 29 , 19 60 , p. 5, 
col. 2. "1 } . the Foreign Kinister Thanat Khoman, recently
wrote that Thailand would increasingly seek better under­
standing with ’other nations who do not share our views on 
world issues . . . even . . . those who do not share our 
social system.’ This astonishingly Nehruvian remark from 
a spokesman of one of the most vocal anti-neutralists in 
South-East Asia marks in part the final weariness with 
carrying the American standard against the crises of 
’lackey' and 'when are you going to become Asian again?"’ 
Subsequent Thai pressure on the United States to reassure 
the Thai position evolved in the issuance of the Rusk-Khoman 
declaration of March 6, 1962: " . . .  The Secretary of State
reaffirmed that this obligation of the United States does 
not depend upon the prior agreement of all other parties to 
the Treaty, since this Treaty obligation is individual as 
well as collective." It is interesting to note that the 
British took an exact opposite view from that of the United 
States. Rt. Hon. Michael Stewart, "British Foreign Policy 
Today," Australian Outlook, XX (August, 1966), 12 3:
"Question: What is the attitude of your government in
Vietnam? Answer: That is, of course, a point on which we
and the American Government take a different view. The 
American Government, as I understand it, do regard their 
presence in Vietnam as being in fulfillment of obligations 
under the SEATO Treaty. We do not feel,looking at what the 
Treaty requires, that it would be incumbent on us to put 
forces there because the SEATO Treaty exists. If you study 
the wording of the Treaty I think you will see that we are 
justified in taking this view. We have held therefore, that 
such help as we have given Vietnam, civilian help and so, 
although entirely consistent with SEATO, is not actually 
carrying out of our obligations. You will notice that SEATO 
requires that, in case of direct aggression each country con­
siders how it will act in accordance with its constitutional 
processes--we are not all obliged under the Treaty to take 
the same view, and broadly speaking we have not considered 
this a case where the SEATO Treaty applied, but it is open to 
the United States to take, as they do take, a different view.'
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Chapter M- 
PAKISTAN-INDIAN CRISIS
In a region also close to the Treaty area, and 
including a member-state of SEATO, another problem was in 
the developing stage that soon strained relations between 
other SEATO powers.
Pakistan, also a member of CENTO, is the third 
Asian member of SEATO. Its geographic location makes 
Pakistan important. Its 100-million-plus population marks 
it as a potential power state. Yet by the same criteria, 
Pakistan has inherent problems that distract it from 
realizing its potential.
Geographically, Pakistan is a divided nation with 
over 1,000 miles of Indian territory separating its two 
parts. In its goal of becoming more industrially oriented, 
Pakistan is beset with the problem of her population. The 
people must be fed; being mainly an agrarian state, Pakistan 
does not have the immediate wealth available (using only one 
criterion) to transform itself into an industrial society. 
This is difficult enough in a unified state, but compounded 
in a nation that is geographically divided.
The principal problem facing the Pakistanis is 
India, or rather the enmity that exists between the Moslems
68
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
69
and Hindus. This is not a factor of nation-building, but is 
a real political factor that was at hand before the parti­
tion; led to the confrontation in 1965; and remains a prob­
lem today. How the Pakistanis view any external situation 
is usually in the light of how it will affect the Pakistani- 
Indian situation.^
It is problematical whether in one hundred years the 
feeling now existing between the Moslems and Hindus will 
still have the importance that it has now. But to under­
stand the intensity of feeling between Pakistan and India, 
it is necessary to go back into the beginnings of these two 
states.
The whole of the sub-continent of India had been 
pressuring Britain for many years to gain its freedom.
Mohandas K. Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, leaders of the All
Indian Congress Party, led the drive that eventually gained 
this freedom. But when freedom came, the continent was far 
from being a homogenous unit. It was stratified not only 
sub-politically, but ethnically, linguistically, culturally, 
and religiously. Politically, India had been a fragmented 
collection of over 500 princely states. By far the greatest
division, however, was the religious one that separated
Hindus and Moslems.
^Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends not Masters (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 196 7) , pp. 116-119. Se’e also Drew 
Middleton, America's Stake in Asia (Philadelphia: J. B.
Lippincott Company, 196 8), pp. 147-151.
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Mohammed Ali Jinn ah, head of the Moslem League, had 
been at one time a member of the All India Congress Party.^ 
Because he wanted equality in political matters for the 
"Pakistanis" regardless of the fact that numerically they 
were inferior to the "Indians," he broke with the Congress 
Party when it failed to meet his demand. The result was the 
creation of the Moslem League with the political purpose of 
setting up a separate state for Moslems.
Such a political course, with the goal of breaking 
up what was then British India, was in direct conflict with 
the leaders of the Congress Party. The Indian (Congress 
Party) goal was for a secular state in which all religions 
would exist side by side, with religious freedom granted 
to all. Religious freedom, however, did not carry with it 
"political equality." What the Indians wanted was a state, 
including all that was then India, incorporated into an 
independent India. It would follow, under the rules of 
democracy, that the large majority of those Indians with a 
Hindu background would then dominate the new political 
structure. What the Moslems wanted was a two-state forma­
tion based on a religious disposition.
Such a dichotomy could not long continue. Sir 
Stafford Cripps headed the British delegation which had come
2Norman D. Palmer, South Asia and United States 
Policy, ed. Dayton D. McKean (New York: Houghton MifTlin 
Company, 1966), p. 16 5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
71
out to India to arrange a general plan of independence. 
Although he and others made many attempts to reconcile the 
differences between the Moslem League and the Indian 
Congress, all failed. The final British decision was to 
partition the country, carrying out the Moslem plan.
In reality, partition did not settle basic issues.
In place of the equality that Jinnah had wanted for the 
Pakistani, all that he really obtained was a new political 
setting. In some respects, this left the Pakistani Moslems 
in an even more inferior position. Now the problems of 
nation-building had to be met by the Pakistanis in an 
impoverished geographic and industrial environment.3 While 
the sub-continent is not without resources, its transforma­
tion into an industrial and self reliant area demands 
technology and wealth. Thus, two nations are, because of 
partition, competing for resources and available technology 
that, for the present and foreseeable future, is adequate 
only for the development of a single nation.
While the partition and religious question remain 
vital factors that affect the relationship between the 
Pakistanis and Indians, the problem of Jammu and Kashmir 
is one situation that is in reality a manifestation of the 
above problem.
3por a discussion of both Pakistani and Indian indus­
trial capabilities, see Ibid., pp. 77, 89-90, 101; W. Norman 
Brown, The United States and India and Pakistan (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 142; Chaudhri Muhammad 
Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan (New York: Columbia Univer­
sity Press, 196 7), pp. 3 3 3-3 85, 337-338.
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Technically, Jammu and Kashmir are separate states, 
but they are considered together as the "Kashmir problem."
In a discussion of the Kashmir problem, Norman D. Palmer 
makes a succinct observation: "The 'story of Kashmir' has
often been told, but perhaps never in a way which interested 
outside observers would find both objective and intelli­
gible."^ Kashmir, including Jammu, can be likened to a 
catalyst that keeps aflame the basic enmity dividing the 
Pakistanis (Moslems) and Indians (Hindus). Since the parti­
tion in 1947, this problem has been the vocal issue in which 
politicians of both countries could take refuge. In August 
and September, 1965, however, it flared into open clashes 
between the armed forces of both Pakistan and India. After 
a period of eighteen years of talking, complaining, jockey­
ing, and making bellicose statements, antagonists provoked 
open warfare in Kashmir.^ Both sides threatened an armed 
clash, but probably neither wanted it. Yet both sides 
suffered considerable casualties and loss of war material; 
and, in the end, the issue of Kashmir still was not settled.
Kashmir, in effect, represented a "final" piece of 
the partition that had never been settled in 1947. Kashmir 
and Jammu were small in size, but by being in the northern
^Palmer, op. cit. , p. 2 30 .
^AP dispatch. New York Times, August 11, 1985, p. 2, 
col. 4. See also dispatch. New York Times, August 12, 
1965, p. 1, col. 4,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
73
China-border area, they were correspondingly important 
beyond their size. Kashmir covered some 84,471 square 
miles (about the size of Minnesota). Its population before 
partition was, however, extremely important. Moslems 
accounted for approximately 77.11 per cent, Hindus for 
20.12 per cent, Sikhs for 1.64 per cent, and Buddhists for 
1.00 per cent. The remaining few were Christians, While 
the country was predominantly Moslem, the ruling family of 
Maharaja Hari Singh was Hindu.^
The partition had its legal base in the Indian 
Independence Act of 19 47. British India was the direct 
object of this act. The Princely States of India, however, 
had a different status, and could, under the Act, choose 
either Pakistan or India for making an accession. Because 
Moslems predominated in Kashmir, Pakistan fully expected 
that Kashmir would elect to become part of Pakistan.
However, the Maharaja was reluctant to make any kind of 
decision. He did not like India, nor did he like Moslem 
Pakistan. He also mistrusted the Viceroy, Lord M o u n t b a t t e n , ?  
with the result that he applied to both Pakistan and India 
for a "Standstill Agreement."
^Brown, op. cit. , p. 159.
^He had had an escapade in Britain some years 
earlier and had received bad publicity. Ibid., p. 159, 
and Chaudhri, op. cit. , p. 2 88.
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Such an agreement for Kashmir was to be a "working" 
relationship in the area of railway and general communica­
tions facilities among autonomous units until more perma­
nent arrangements could be worked out. The Maharaja of 
Kashmir offered this agreement to both Pakistan and India, 
but only the Pakistanis accepted the arrangement.®
Events building to a Kashmir confrontation were 
hastened by a march of tribesmen from Poonch. Whether or 
not this movement was originated, encouraged, abetted, 
and/or armed by Pakistani authorities® is a moot question.
In any event, tribesmen invaded the Kashmir area in a 
vengeful march on October 20, 1947. After considerable 
violence and bloodshed, the state forces of Kashmir, 
composed of the security forces of the Maharaja, were routed 
by the tribal lashkar. The Maharaja fled Kashmir to Jammu 
and there urgently requested assistance from India to help 
restore order in Kashmir.
The Indian Government’s reply to this appeal by the 
Maharaja produced the fait accompli that has since evolved 
into the present dispute. The Government, in effect, told 
the Maharaja that for it to comply with his request for
p .  2 8 8 .
®Brown, op. cit., p. 16 2, and Chaudhuri, op. cit.,
®There is some disagreement concerning whether or 
not this "intrusion" by Moslem tribesmen was done without 
the knowledge of Pakistani authorities. Brown and Chaudhri 
Muhammad Ali take opposite views.
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help, he would have to sign the instrument of accession to 
India. This he did, and India at once treated Kashmir as 
an integral part of India. The Pakistanis refused to 
recognize this "legalization" of the Kashmir matter. 
Pakistani troops eventually moved into the disputed area 
to confront Indian forces. In retaliation, and perhaps to 
gain public support for its side, the Indians introduced 
the "Kashmir question" to the Security Council of the United 
Nations.
The United Nations Security Council, along with the 
United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNICIP), 
had made several attempts at settling the long-standing 
dispute. Failing that, both bodies had sought to bring the 
sides together for meaningful negotiations. All had failed. 
The only concrete result of United Nations efforts had been 
the stationing of personnel along the demarcation line that 
separated the forces of both countries.
The Pakistani contention before the United Nations 
was that India had violated its own agreement to conduct a 
plebescite in Kashmir. The Indian position was that certain 
prerequisites to such a plebescite had to be met, namely 
that all Pakistani forces would be withdrawn and infiltra­
tion into Kashmir halted. The Indians maintained that these
l^AP dispatch. New York Times, August 24, 196 5, 
p. 6, cols. 1 and 2. See also AP dispatch, New York Times, 
August 25, 1965, p. 11, col. 1.
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pre-conditions had not been met. In addition, now that the 
instrument of accession had been signed, the Indians 
regarded it as no longer a valid point for discussion, 
since Kashmir was now an integral part of the Indian union.
The United Nations was able to effect a cease fire 
between the two adversaries in the 19 6 5 armed confronta­
tion.^^ A meeting between President Mohammad Ayub Khan of 
Pakistan and Mr. Lai Bahadur Shastri, Prime Minister of 
India, took place in Tashkent (the Soviet Union) after that 
country offered its good offices in assisting in a 
negotiation.
Since the early 19 50 's, relations between the United 
States and Pakistan, which at one time had been most warm 
and cordial, began to "cool" considerably. The clash 
between Pakistan, a CENTO and SEATO ally, and India, also a 
friend of the United States, posed an immediate and 
anguished dilemma for the United States : the position it
should take in this confrontation between two nations with 
whom it had good relations. The United States, seeing no 
way out of this dilemma, chose a legalistic approach,
l^The United Nations Security Council Resolution 
(authored by the Netherlands) was passed 10-0, Jordan 
abstaining. It called for a cease-fire within 48 hours 
between the belligérants. ̂  dispatch. New York Times
September 21, 1965, p. 1, cols. 6 and 8. See also ibid.,
September 22, 196 5, p. 1, cols. 6 and 8, and ibid.,
September 23, 1965, p. 1, cols. 5, 7, and 8.
i^Ibid., September 20, 1965, p. 1, cols. 6, 7, 8, 
and p. 2, col. 1.
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working through the machinery of the United Nations to bring 
about a cease fire. This occasioned the imposition of a 
moratorium on arms shipments to both Pakistan and India. 
Britain followed suit.
Pakistani reaction to this American move was 
predictable :
Karachi . . . Informed sources said today it was highly 
unlikely that Pakistan had categorically told the 
United States that she would seek Soviet military 
aircraft if Washington would not agree to replace 
obsolete F-86 jet fighters of the Pakistan Air Force.
Washington . . . The State Department said today it had 
no evidence that Pakistan would receive military jets .
. . . The White House has held up an expected pledge of 
$300 million in aid to Pakistan pending a review of the 
growing Pakistani ties to Moscow and Peking. Pakistan 
has reacted bitterly with charges that the United 
States is seeking to impose aid with strings attached.
Pakistan’s war resources were inferior to India’s 
in armed forces, war material, and the capacity for making 
such equipment. Pakistan needed to buy almost all of its 
basic material abroad. As a SEATO ally of the United 
States, Pakistan had received almost $4 billion in military 
and economic aid over the last d e c a d e . B u t  as the Pakis­
tanis viewed it, their military needs were quite urgent.
In addition, what the Pakistanis had been claiming 
for three years came about: the vast quantities of aid
and arms that the United States and Britain had given to
l^Ibid., August 14, 196 5, p. 2, col. 5, and p. 4,
col. 4.
l^Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, p. 2 70.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
78
India in 1962^^ in its border clash with Red China were now 
being used against Pakistan. India, of course, was making 
the same claim to the United States— that arms given the 
Pakistani for "anti-Communist” defenses were being used 
against India.
The unequal treatment they had received from the 
United States had long rankled the Pakistani mind. The 
Pakistanis maintained that as an ally of the United States, 
their nation should have a preferred position, as against 
a country who (1) was not an ally, and (2) often opposed 
United States policy on "ideological" grounds. India, it 
had been estimated, had received some $5.9 billion in 
American aid, and, since the Sino-Indian clash, had obtained 
an additional $200 million in military aid, with $80 million 
more expected.
l^This refers to the Sino-Indian border clash which 
occurred between October 20 and November 20, 1962, The 
United States and Britain sent massive shipments of arms to 
help bolster Indian defenses. Both the United States and 
Britain stipulated that these arms were to be used only in 
Indian defense against the Chinese invasion, and that they 
were not to be used in any conflict with the Pakistanis.
The Indians gave these assurances.
l^New York Times, September 12, 1965, p. 1, cols. 7 
and 8, and p~ 2, cols. 3"-8. See also Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., 
"American Diplomatic Tactics and Neutralism," Political 
Science Quarterly, LXXVIII (September, 1963), 424. Pakis­
tani official's publicly conceded, for example, that the 
military buildup of their country would "force" India to 
reach a settlement of the deadlocked Kashmir question.
While American arms were intended for defense. President 
Ayub Khan of Pakistan stated that "it is an Asian country 
(India) that has been oppressing us and continues to oppress 
us." Evident differences existed between Washington and
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Pakistanis were rapidly deciding that it was not 
worth being an ally of the United States if their chief 
enemy was to get better treatment. They began to look 
elsewhere for aid.l?
A definite rapprochement with both Moscow and Peking 
took place. There is evidence that Peking definitely helped 
Pakistan during the confrontation with India by making sud­
den demands on India during the height of the fighting. The 
Chinese issued an "ultimatum" to India to dismantle its 
bases on their mutual b o r d e r , w h i c h  had the effect of
Karachi concerning the circumstances under which such 
weapons might legitimately be used. To New Delhi, American 
officials stressed that Karachi was pledged to "consult" 
with the United States before employing them. Yet Presi­
dent Khan stated openly, "'At times, our American friends 
seem to question our right to defend our territory even, 
or take such action as will bring security. . . . America 
should be mindful . . . that if our territory was violated, 
we should spend our time dealing with the enemy rather 
than putting American weapons in cotton wool.'"
l?Khan, op. cit., pp. 117-119, 155-157. "Another 
major loss we suffered in joining the Pact (CENTO) was that 
we were deprived of the opportunity to understand the Soviet 
Union earlier. The Russians were our neighbors and, as 
later events proved, we would have been able to understand 
each other better if some contact had been established 
between us. Because of the absence of any contact, many 
misunderstandings cropped up and the leaders of the Soviet 
Union decided to give full support to India. This more than 
nullified whatever economic and military advantages we gained 
from the Pact. . . . Both the SEATO and CENTO Pacts have 
lost much of the value they had, though they still retain 
some kind of formal significance."
^^AP dispatch. New York Times, September 15, 1965, 
p. 1, cols. 2-3. See also ibid., September 17, 1965, p. 1, 
cols. 6 and 8. The Chinese extended their deadline by three 
days to the Indians; ibid., September 20, 1965, p. 1, cols.
5 and 8 and p. 2, col. 1. See also Anwar Syed, "Sino- 
Pakistan Relations— An Overview," Pakistan Horizon, XXII 
(Second Quarter, 1969), 115-116.
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diverting much Indian strength to the northern frontiers,
where there were reports of an exchange of fire between
the Chinese and Indian forces. It is quite probable that
this "help" was not lost on the Pakistanis, when during
the fighting, they found themselves almost "frozen out"
from their Western partners.
Better relations between Pakistan and China appeared
evident in the 196 3 border realignment agreement between the
two countries. A Pakistani military mission was more than
*1 Qcordially received in Peking. While the Pakistanis, as 
allies of the United States, had previously spoken out in 
favor of a two-China policy, they no longer continued in 
this vein. And it should be noted that China, unlike the 
Soviet Union, made no objection when Pakistan joined
SEATO.20
The Soviet Union also did a diplomatic about-face 
regarding relations with the Pakistanis. There had been 
much made of the favorable balance struck between India and 
the Soviet Union since the visit of Khruschev and Bulganin 
to New Delhi. Pakistani relations soon broadened into a 
much firmer relationship which had as its result military
lOgyed, ibid., p. 111. See also the speech of Air 
Marshal Nur Khan, "Pakistan-China Relations," Pakistan 
Horizon, XXII (Third Quarter, 1969), 2 88. See also Dilip 
Mukerjee, "India’s Defence Perspectives," International 
Affairs, XLIV (October, 1968), 666-667.
2'^Harish Kapur, "China’s Relations with India and 
Pakistan," Current History, LVII (September, 1969), 158.
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and economic benefits to Pakistan. War material (mostly MIG 
jets), loans, and Soviet experts assisting in several indus­
trial developments came to P a k i s t a n . T h e  Pakistanis were 
also now receiving loans and trade missions from East 
European countries.
Needless to say, this apparent shift of Pakistan 
away from the United States caused concern in some circles. 
Other issues— Indonesian independence, recognition of Red 
China, the United States keeping the "Tunisian" question 
from the United Nations Security Council agenda, and other 
aspects of the cold war— on which the United States had 
expressed itself have found Pakistan on the opposite side.
Pakistan is Moslem. This aligns it with other 
Moslem states in regard to the Israeli situation. There­
fore Pakistan as a nation now looks toward the other Moslem 
states with more than just kindness. The United States' 
deepening commitment to Israel further widens the gap 
between Pakistan and the United States. But for the pres­
ent, the central issue is Kashmir.
This new phase in Pakistani relationships with 
other major powers bodes a turn away from past relatively 
traditional ties to the United States. How it will 
eventually affect Pakistani ties to SEATO remains to be
21official communique issued in Rawalpindi on the 
occasion of the visit to Pakistan of Premier Kosygin. 
Pakistan Horizon, XXI (Second Quarter, 1968), 220-221.
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seen in future developments. However, if past utterances 
of Pakistani leaders are to be taken at face value, then 
it may well be surmised that SEATO, as well as CENTO, ties 
will lose what significance they held and a new posture of 
alignment for Pakistan will unfold.
These then are the three primal cases needed for an 
examination of political forces that were in progress with 
direct effects on several of the powers belonging to SEATO. 
They are used because of their critical nature and the fact 
that they did involve five of the eight members. While it 
might be difficult to claim that in themselves they were 
turning points or benchmarks as regards those particular 
power’s outlook in their relationship toward either the 
United States or SEATO, the claim can be made that taken 
together they provide an essential insight into some of the 
patterns of political directions that were, and are, taking 
shape. It is from these patterns that a factor of probabili­
ties can be projected.
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Chapter 5 
DISCUSSION
David Easton, in A Framework for Political Analysis, 
states that for "tool" purposes, "any set of political 
elements we wish to consider a system automatically becomes 
one.
This study has used the "tool" of Professor 
Brecher’s concept of a "geographic" system, i.e.. Dominant 
System, Subordinate System. It is assumed that the idea 
of a geographic system is a system in reality.
The study of SEATO has been made within such a 
constructed framework, with the series of situational crises 
being presented as evidence. It must be clear, however, 
that the core area of concentration thus far has been in 
the political interchanges among the members or units out­
side the system of SEATO— with the exception of the Laotian 
Crisis. This paper is not a study of the sub-system of 
SEATO as such.
For purposes of discussion, a focus can now be made 
on the core area of SEATO. What effect have the actions of 
members had on the sub-system?
^David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.l Prentice-Hall Inc., 196T)7 p • 5T.
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It is well known that there are in the Global System 
many groupings, alliances, and pacts that, irrespective of 
some degree of cohesive quality, cannot bridge the division 
that exists between their members. There should be no dif­
ficulty in accepting the idea that for conceptual purposes, 
the total collection of other systems and sub-systems that 
surround the sub-system of SEATO represents the Extra- 
Societal E n v i r o n m e n t .2 The remainder of the totality of 
environment is made up of those socio-economic-cultural 
aspects which affect the society both internally and exter­
nally.
If it is accepted that there are other systems and 
sub-systems existing within the Global System, it should 
not be too difficult to accept that these other entities 
have a relationship that is important to SEATO in two 
respects. First, one or more of these entities could con­
ceivably be in competition or conflict with SEATO, if their 
goals were diametrically opposed. Second, where no goal- 
competition existed between SEATO and other systems, dual­
membership in other systems by member-units of SEATO has 
taken place. As a result, the possibility exists that the
The term "surround" is not used in the perjorative 
sense where the object is the focal point; it merely con­
notes the idea that the object has a random setting spa­
tially. The fact that such a unit could have another or 
other units in competition with it is not used at this point,
OThis precludes membership in a Universal Actor such 
as the United Nations.
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total allocative values of any unit, instead of being at the 
disposal of SEATO, would have to be distributed on a wider 
basis. This is not to project that, because of the avail­
ability of such resource to the individual units, such an 
allocation on their part would be immediately forthcoming 
to the sub-system of SEATO. That determination or inter­
action is implicit in this discussion.
The point has been raised that even during the 
formative period of SEATO certain factors were present in 
the system which were certain to produce stress.^ At the 
system level, Britain and France were already engaged in the 
process of restructuring their goals to match their dimin­
ished capacity of resource allocation. Such a restructuring 
of goals necessitated political decisions which pointed to 
a lesser involvement on the world scene.
Notwithstanding the fact that nation-states ulti­
mately must fix the primacy of their own goals or national 
interests, the question must be raised as to whether induce­
ments or rewards from the chief elite might not influence 
these political decisions. Notwithstanding, the decisions 
of Britain and France to alter their "presence" in Southeast 
Asia would have a delimiting effect on their membership
^No contention is intended that an alliance, pact, 
or sub-system is created that can be free from stressful 
qualities. In any association, it is assumed that the 
authoritative person or persons has made an assessment of 
factors present, with the hope or conclusion that positive 
factors outweigh negative ones.
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in SEATO and participation in the various functions of that 
body.
It should be kept in mind that in the case of the 
French, there was political demand for complete French 
withdrawal in the Indo-China area.^ Internally, the French 
political structure was going through a long period of 
instability. Other member-units could no longer count on 
long term commitments from France in this area.
Another distraction (in the formative stages of 
SEATO, and continuing to the present in varied degrees) for 
the Western European Subordinate System was the question of 
the EDO. For many months a series of negotiating sessions 
had been held with the view of constructing some form of 
joint European defence community. After the plan reached 
the ratification state, French consent was crucial. But 
British promises of cooperation and United States promises 
of aid apparently were not enough to overcome the French 
fear of a re-armed Western Germany.® This was a setback 
to the plans of NATO for an overall defensive strategy.
®"Why Diplomats Are in Trouble: Their Own Govern­
ments Can’t Back Them Up," U.S. News S World Report,
May 21, 1954, p. 36. Also see in op. cit.: "U.S. Allies--
Getting Weaker," pp. 28-29 ; "Men de s-Fran ce : It Is the End
of a Nightmare," July 30, 19 54, pp. 89-9 0.
®It is somewhat ironic that Britain, the very 
nation that broached the idea of a type of "European" army 
in the beginning, to a large degree was responsible for its 
defeat. Anthony Eden in a speech in Rome declared that 
Britain, while supporting the formation of such an entity, 
could not itself join such a force.
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The result was that French reluctance created a serious 
strain in Allied councils. The French presented a proposal 
that Britain and West Germany would not accept; the West 
Germans had a plan that the French and British would not 
accept; and the British were reluctant to make anything but 
a nominal promise of assistance. Yet, to the Western mind 
(mainly the United States), EDC, or some form of closer 
linking of European defense plans and resource capability, 
in conjunction with NATO, clearly served as the key feature 
in the whole global concept.
Essential to any perspective or understanding of 
SEATO is the recognition and acceptance of two explicit 
elements contained within the sub-system. First is the item 
that SEATO, like other similar defense treaties, is a 
response body. Second, there must be unanimity among the 
units in regard to any action that the collective body 
takes. Closely associated with this second element is the 
fact that the language contained within the instrument of 
the Treaty denotes that "constitutional processes" of the 
members will be met.
rt could be argued that such a shaping of SEATO at 
the very beginning into a sort of deliberative body pre­
cluded that it could ever be able to meet any military 
commitment of its stated goal: the containment of aggres­
sion. On the other hand, it could be logically argued that 
the level or spirit of agreement attained by the language
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of the Treaty was all on which the participants would, or 
could, effectively agree. It should also be remembered that 
the United States made an explicit addendum "understanding" 
to the Treaty.? Again, like other similar measures, SEATO 
is an open system. More stringent measures or additional 
features can be added at later times. One noteworthy 
addition has been the adoption of a more sophisticated 
mechanism in the Secretariat.
Both Easton and Young remark that an overload may 
occur if "the channels of communication to receive such 
demands cannot adequately handle the volume of the 
demands."®
In the discussion of SEATO the aspect of membership 
is important. First of all, only three of the eight member- 
units are in fact members of the "region" wherein the Treaty 
Area lies. The other members are extra-regional.^ This has 
caused disturbances from intra-societal areas. The "non- 
Asiatic" quality of the majority of the member-units of 
SEATO has caused adverse reactions from the Asian states. 
India, Ceylon, Burma, Cambodia, Singapore, Malaysia, Indo­
nesia have all adversely commented on not only the "non- 
Asiatic" quality of the membership of SEATO, but even on
?Appendix C, p. 134.
Byoung, op. cit., pp. 18-19.
^Melvin Gurtov, Southeast Asia Tomorrow (Baltimore; 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), pp. 1^3.
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the fact that a force for collective defense was created 
in the area. And central to this general area of country 
discontent was India. She had been, is, and probably for 
some time in the future will remain, a leader of the "Third 
World" nations.
The concept of boundary provides the basis for a 
second point about membership. While Article VIII of the 
Treaty defines the geographic area or boundary that is 
encompassed, the very idea of boundary must then connote 
something else because of membership. While the Treaty area 
is Asian, the Treaty group is made up of countries with dual 
membership obligations, for in some cases the members belong 
to other sub-systems or Subordinate Systems. It must then 
be accepted that the political boundaries of SEATO range 
much farther than the stated Treaty Area. In fact, we can 
assume for political purposes the SEATO boundaries extend 
to the influential limits of each member-unit.
While this may be a fundamental concept, it never­
theless poses levels of a potential conflict of interest, 
which, if occurring, could bring resultant conditions of 
stress on the sub-system. The relationship between sub­
systems, in the form of NATO for example, or the Asian and 
Pacific Council (ASPAC), or the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and SEATO, could be on divergent 
courses. As such, some powers, having membership in these 
other organizations, as well as in SEATO, would be caught
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up in a foreign policy dilemma. Added to this relationship 
is the problem that extra-regionalism poses, with conditions 
and demands of other subordinate areas which also contain 
SEATO power members posing an equally serious dilemma.
While there is no evidence as yet obtainable 
pointing to the making of a demand by France and Britain 
on the United States for example, for certain dispositions 
within the NATO structure concerning their actions during 
the Suez affair, it would be hard to imagine that the 
subsequent United States attitude and actions in response 
to French and British moves did not have a profound effect 
on these countries within the scope of their membership 
within the Subordinate System of Western Europe. It can be 
further argued that such United States actions, if not 
directly, at least in an indirect fashion, influenced later 
thinking and political decision-making on the part of these 
two powers. If the failure of the Suez venture can be 
credited as being the cause for the resignation of Anthony 
Eden as British Prime Minister, then certainly the United 
States, because of the actions that it took, must assume 
part of that responsibility.
Earlier, the criterion of the qualitative factor was 
mentioned as being important in that a demand, because of 
its nature, could produce within a given system, such a 
disturbance as to result in stress against that very system. 
In this fashion, note should also be taken of subsequent
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French actions occurring within the framework of the sub­
system of NATO, having an effect in the Subordinate System 
of Western Europe where that sub-system is located. This 
refers of course to the French decision to request a with­
drawal of all NATO facilities from French soil.^^ A French 
demand that a change of policy on the part of the United 
States was needed, with the implication that there will be 
no French cooperation in stated goals, was thus injected 
within the sub-system. Increasingly, French attention, 
under the then firm rule of Charles De Gaulle, was being 
devoted to making France paramount on the Continent. Any­
thing that detracted from this goal was in basic conflict 
with French interests. From the many remarks that President 
De Gaulle had made on the subject, it can be seen that the 
presence of United States forces, although a necessary facet 
of NATO tactical and strategic concepts, was nonetheless
iO"For some years, the French Government has indi­
cated on numerous occasions, both public and in conversa­
tions with the Allied Governments, that it considered the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization as no longer fulfilling, 
insofar as it is concerned, the conditions prevailing in the 
world at present, which are fundamentally different from 
those of 1949 and the years thereafter. . . . The French 
Government considers these agreements in their entirety, 
as no longer fulfilling the present conditions, which lead 
it to reassume full exercise of its sovereignty on French 
territory, in other words, to accept being responsible in 
any respect whatsoever to authorities other than the French 
authorities. It is prepared to study and eventually, to 
settle with the United States Government the practical con­
sequences of this. . . . "  French Foreign Policy: Official
Statements Speeches and Communiques 19 66 (NewYork:
Ambassade t)e France, Service de Presse et d'information, 
1966), pp. 25-27.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
92
interpreted by De Gaulle as being an inhibitor to the 
French. Further, and to a larger degree, the presence of 
United States economic prowess, as manifested by the 
increasing influx of powerful corporate interests into the 
European economic life further enlarged these French fears.
In SEATO the situation of both demands and conflict­
ing "cross-demands" has been experienced. As was seen in 
the Laotian Crisis, the demands by the chief elite were of 
such a nature as to cause a disturbance within the sub­
system. At that point, the communicative process of a 
feedback was either being ignored by the chief elite--the 
United States— or was at a low stage because of a failure to 
alter goals, or was a combination of the two induced by the 
inability of the United States to alter its own objectives, 
thereby setting into motion diplomatic maneuvers which 
met objection by other member-units.
There are several alternatives which can be taken 
when a system is presented with an imbalance or disturbance 
leading to a stress condition.
If a system or state cannot cope with the stress, 
then it can "escape," or at least relieve some of the 
pressures of the induced stress by several methods. Essen­
tially, these fall into three general areas or levels; 
first it can accept the condition; second, it can reject 
such conditions or demands that impose the stress ; or 
third, it can either alter the structure of its own
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
93
organization so as to comply with the conditions set forth, 
or alter the nature or status of those demands so as to 
conform with the already established structure or system.
For France, regarding her problems in the sub-system 
of NATO and the Subordinate System of Western Europe, it can 
be discerned she opted for the form of the second solution. 
In the case of the Laotian Crisis, it will be seen that the 
third solution, with the alteration of goals or demands made 
by the chief elite was made with subsequent adjustments in 
problem perception carried out. Such a reduction by the 
chief elite, in its qualitative demand for strong measures-- 
conceivably culminating in the use of force in the back-up 
of those demands— thereby resulted in a better acceptance by 
the other SEATO powers.
Built into the structure of SEATO is the conflict- 
mechanism— conditions for disturbance— of unanimity. While 
this mechanistic function was an accepted feature of SEATO, 
it nonetheless must be viewed as a definite impediment to 
a system. A condition of reciprocity can set in when a unit 
on the "losing" side views the response of the "winners"
(in this case the diminished or altered collective response) 
as not meeting what it believes to be minimal conditions for 
its continued functioning or participation in the system.
This whole area of discussion leads to an important 
element as crucial to this review as it is to any foreign
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policy deliberation: that is the concept of problem-
perception on the part of the individual members of the 
sub-system.
David V. Edwards, describing conditions of problem- 
perception, states that: "Man reacts, of course, to how he
perceives reality rather than to reality as such. The sum 
of what we think we know, rather than what is really true, 
determines what plan or policy we adopt and what actions 
we then attempt. And, of course, the critical factor of 
this "perception" on the part of the decision-makers or 
states is the concept of values.
Values, in this context, takes on added significance 
as Edwards makes the comment: "Throughout history those who
have been concerned with human action have often contended 
that one or another action or institution was the 'best' 
or 'correct' one. Such contentions have often resulted in 
arguments and even wars because debaters were arguing about 
objective facts rather than about preferred values.
In any discussion of SEATO, one must always come 
back to the base motive of each power for joining SEATO.
Just what was there in the suggested alliance that would 
attract states to join such a body? Would such a joining 
result in the enhancement of their individual position and
l^David V. Edwards, International Political Analysis 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), p. TT.
IZlbid., p. 24.
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would it benefit the goals or values that they had set forth 
for themselves to follow, and,if possible, achieve?
Could it not perhaps be a deduction that there were 
some three broadly conceived ideas that motivated the 
eventual members of SEATO in joining the alliance? The 
United States, as the prime architect of SEATO, still 
remained in the throes of its struggle with the menace of 
Communism as manifested in the actions of the Soviet Union. 
The absorption of Poland into the Red orbit--accompanied as 
it was by the mysterious death of Jan Masaryk in Czechoslo- 
vakia--did little to alleviate United States' suspicions 
concerning overall Russian expansionist endeavors. Added 
to this was the trouble that the Allied powers had had with 
the Russians in Berlin and the subsequent airlift to over­
come the Russian "blockade." And there had been the costly 
Korean War that the United States and its allies had con­
cluded with a stalemate. Such "evidence" as this convinced 
many of the decision-makers in the United States that the 
Communistic monolith could only be combatted successfully 
by a "ring of containment." Finally, there was the deterio­
rating situation that the French found themselves in in the 
Indo-China area with the "Communist" forces of the Vietminh. 
If anything further was needed to convince the American 
administration that Communism was indeed on the march 
against the principles and ideals of Western democracy, 
there was the loss of mainland China to Communist control.
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Surely, only a show of resolve and force in the way of a 
buffer or "dike" could prove effective to settle this 
dilemma. That buffer would be SEATO.
Thailand viewed the evolving situation in South-East 
Asia and the Far East in much the same light that the United 
States did. The Thais were increasingly worried about their 
own large segment of Chinese living in Thailand. There was 
the further worry of the Northeastern and Southern provinces 
that were, in effect, soft-spots in the Thai position. Then, 
too, not only were the French fighting next door in the 
Indo-China area, but the British as well were having their 
Communist troubles in Malaya.
It is quite true that these problems did exist. It 
is also true that there was at that time a feeling of un­
easiness concerning the colossus that China was felt to be 
and the eventual designs that she was thought to have out­
side her territory. It would be quite easy to rationalize 
that because of these problems being so close to Thailand, 
that she was justified in feeling endangered. It would be 
therefore quite logical for her to give support to a plan 
that would in some manner offer her a collective-type 
security arrangement.
Cognizance should be given to the fact that logic 
often fails to lend perception when trying to fathom between 
that which is real and that which is merely superficial in 
foreign policy. This would hold especially true in the case
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of Thailand. Professor George Modelski gives an excellent 
account of Thai politics and their seeming fluctuating 
s t a t e . A c c o r d i n g  to Prince Wan Waithayakorn, the then 
Foreign Minister of Thailand, the specter of mainland China 
did indeed pose a problem for the Thais for which they 
sought assistance in relieving this seeming pressure. At 
the same time, Thai membership in the Treaty was viewed as 
". . . not only non-aggressive but also non-provocative.
While this attitude may have been the prevailing one 
at the time, and in spite of the fact that Thailand now lets 
armed forces of the United States be stationed on Thai soil 
thereby permitting somewhat "clandestine” air strikes being 
made in Laos and Vietnam, it would nonetheless appear that 
there is a change occurring in the Thai role toward its big 
neighbor China.
Part of this change, subtle as it may appear, 
apparently stems from Thai reaction to what they felt should 
have occurred in SEATO as regards the Treaty Area, and what 
in fact did not. With that in mind, it should not be too 
surprising to see that the Thais would begin to re-examine 
their position to see what new avenues would have to be 
explored in order to preserve the essential ingredient,
Thai sovereignty and integrity.
l^George Modelski, "Thailand and China," Policies 
Toward China: Views from Six Continents, ed. A. M. Halpern
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 348-'36 7.
l^Ibid., p. 352.
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As an indication of this new attitude, the publicly 
stated views of the current Foreign Minister, Dr. Thanat 
Khoman, should be examined quite closely. A second indica­
tion of this attitude would be Thai participation in— and 
in one case, Thai organization of--the relatively new, 
strictly Asiatic regional organizations that now appear in 
this area.
It is conjectural at this point whether or not the 
joining by Thailand of substitute organizations would have 
taken place if they felt completely satisfied with SEATO. 
Certainly the economic aspects of ASEAN and ASPAC represent 
a hope for increased development in this area of the world 
that is so in need of every economic tool of which it can 
take advantage. Yet at the same time, the appearance of 
this development, accompanied as it is by Thai official 
statements that " . . .  Thailand would increasingly seek 
better understanding with other nations who do not share 
our views on world issues . . . would lend strength to
the idea that a change of direction is being instituted in 
Thailand's foreign policy outlook.
Pakistan and the Philippines present differing out­
looks in how they viewed the construction of SEATO. On the 
one hand, the Philippines have had traditional ties with the 
United States and it was axiomatic that they would go along
iSpalmer, op. cit., p. 16 5.
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with the United States on such a venture. They were 
insular, and such a further "commitment" in addition to 
the Mutual Security treaties of 19 51, 19 52, and 195 3 with 
the United States was not without benefit as President 
Magsaysay saw it. In addition, the Philippines was just 
emerging from an internal fight with the Hukbo ng Bayan 
Laban sa Hapon (Huks) who, from many appearances, did have 
some Communist connections. Yet, an increasing anti- 
American feeling has begun to make itself evident in the 
Philippines with a subsequent shift of Philippine policy 
becoming more independent from that of the United States.
An indication of this change, for just one example, was the 
withdrawal of the 2,000 man Philippine contingent that had 
previously been sent to Vietnam to assist South Vietnamese 
and American forces.
In the case of Pakistan, the enigma and "Achilles 
Heel" that exists in both her internal as well as external 
policies has at its root the problem of India. This has 
caused, and will continue to cause, blind spots in the 
Pakistani quest for general security. Be that as it may, 
it does not cover up serious and even extreme problems 
that have and will face the Pakistani on their road to
l^This position was corroborated in an interview 
I had with the Speaker of the Philippine House of Repre­
sentatives. A further indication of the position was 
also given by an aide to the now President of the Philip­
pines, Ferdinand Marcos.
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nation-building. "The unity of Pakistan lies in its 
adherence to Islam, yet Islamic thought, and the retrograde 
attitudes of the sect leaders, hinders the creation of a 
meaningful political entity." Leicester Webb here touches 
on a most salient point, and it is perhaps the real crux 
of the problem of Pakistan.
Nevertheless, the polity of Pakistan has, and more 
or less to the same degree establishes, its view toward 
other powers in light of their position and attitude to 
India. This has led to a Pakistani rapprochement with both 
Moscow and Peking— the latter ironically being the central 
reason for the formation of SEATO. Thus there would appear 
to be truth in the statement that " . . .  Pakistan's main 
concern was the alleged Indian threat and not the defense 
of South-East Asia against Communist expansion. . . . ^
Such a rapprochement or re-alignment would of necessity 
mean a shift of ties or loyalties away from a strictly 
doctrinaire stance that is posed by the presence of SEATO.
It should be noted, however, both in the case of Pakistan 
and Thailand, that Red China did not really direct any 
polemics against them merely because of their membership 
in SEATO. It was really only after the stationing of United 
States armed forces in Thailand that Red China began a
l^Khalid Bin Sayeed, "Pakistan and China: The Scope
and Limits of Convergent Policies," Policies Toward China: 
Views from Six Continents (New York: McGraw-HillV 19650, 
p. 2Ü1.
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concerted campaign of implied threats against Thailand, 
for, rightly or wrongly, the Chinese viewed such a measure 
as a constituted threat against them directly.
On a comparative note, Australia and New Zealand, 
because of their location, population, and lack of an ade­
quate armed force capability, can be considered minimal 
powers. Their previous adherence to the protective capa­
bility of Britain was divested by Britain herself due to 
the retrenchment of resources at home and the ensuing 
withdrawal of British forces "East of Suez." Faced with 
this reality, and positioned as they are in an environment 
of over one billion Asiatics, who are in one form or 
another somewhat hostile to Western culture and the memories 
of colonialism that it conjures up, it is not too surprising 
that they should gravitate toward the one power whom they 
feel they have close ties to and who, at the same time, has 
interests in the Pacific area— the United States. Only the 
United States, a friendly power as it were, had sufficient 
power to fill the vacuum that the departure of both the 
British and French created. So, in addition to being 
gratified with the creation of the security that the ANZUS 
Pact brought, the formation of SEATO posed yet another 
answer, and, as it were, the supposed additional security 
of additional powers confronting the Communist threat. At 
the heart of the matter, though, was the overwhelming power
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
102
capability of the United States that gives reality to this 
or any commitment.
The problem perception of Britain and France pre­
sented an entirely different appraisal of the situation as 
that looked upon by the other powers of SEATO. Both were 
colonial powers at the time. While Britain was giving up 
her Empire on a relatively easy basis, France was engaged 
in a bloody and hotly-contested war in Indo-China that was 
proving costly to her in men and resources, and was begin­
ning to be so unpopular at home as to affect the stability 
of the government.
Britain still had close ties with Australia and 
New Zealand as well as Malaya, Borneo, Sarawak, Brunei and 
her Crown Colony of Hong Kong. And it should be assumed 
that Britain would remain loyal to these ties in the event 
of any real trouble that affected them. Notwithstanding, 
it could be assumed that the British decision was motivated, 
not so much in the vein that Red China constituted a real 
threat in the form of expansionist moves, but served as a 
ready-made solution that had the advantage of permitting 
a reduction of British forces in the area under the "safety" 
of an American presence. At the same time it retained a 
British "voice" as regards any serious decisions that had 
to be made in that area, and through this medium also 
retained some measure of the old "Empire Life-line" 
presence that could serve as a redeeming factor to both
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Britain and the colonial and Commonwealth members in that 
area. Underlying though it may be, a British participation 
in the SEATO Treaty of 19 54 made up for the omission of 
Britain in the 19 51 ANZUS Pact.
In essence, then, it can be surmised that the above 
represented some goals or values that could be achieved, 
or at least benefit a powers membership in such an organiza­
tion as SEATO.
But time stands still for no one, and while the peri­
od of fifteen years that SEATO has been in existence can be 
considered a short span of time, it can also be more than 
enough to witness events and elements of change that by 
their nature either alter or even obviate values and goals 
once considered important.
Polarity, which once was an accepted state of exist­
ence in the world scene, has now evolved into a form of 
"soft" polarity, or even a form of polycentrism. Causing 
that evolution has been a series of factors, but central to 
it has been the detente that has come about between the two 
giants, the United States and the Soviet Union. As such, 
the problem or perceived threat of Communism to the Western 
and Third World has seemed to diminish. And with that 
diminuation has come a shift in attitudes on the part of 
the leaders of many countries, not the least of which 
includes members of the SEATO organization toward both 
the Soviet Union and China.
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If, then, the Soviet Union and China really do not 
represent a threat to the vital interests of the members 
comprising SEATO, and for that matter the other nations as 
well, then positions taken, attitudes assumed, and alloca­
tions of resources made can be shifted to other areas. In 
this case, those areas of concern and concentration would 
be the internal ones of the various states.
Few nations of the world are so well resourcefully 
and technologically advanced— with attendant industrial 
capacity— that they can long afford to have their society 
and economy geared constantly to an external crisis level. 
Fewer still have societies that would allow such a situation 
to continue if only a "stalemate" occurred from the resul­
tant process. There are several reasons for this, but if 
only one is advanced, it would be the level of competition 
in economy that exists between the many nations of the 
world. A nation today can ill afford to fall behind in 
the race for p r o g r e s s . As J. J. Servan-Schreiber points 
out, a very real dilemma faces the nations of Europe.19 
The need for growth and development at a faster rate encom­
passing the levels of innovation, technology, and scientific
1 This excludes consideration of the underdeveloped 
nations and takes into account primarily the nations of 
Europe and Japan. Because of their advanced status, it would 
also exclude the two superpowers.
19J. J. Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge 
(New York: Atheneurn, 1969), pp. 26, 40-41, 102-105.
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research are the criterion that will be needed. This can 
be achieved easier in a political environment that is 
relatively free from the economic burdens that a crisis is 
generally accompanied by. This is not meant to imply that 
those nations who are free from foreign entanglements are 
necessarily going to advance more rapidly than others.
There are many examples to the contrary. However, that 
nation or nations which are relatively free from foreign 
commitments perhaps have a better chance at succeeding.
In this vein, whether by design or happenstance, the 
posturing of both Britain and France would seem to bear this 
out. They may rationalize differently concerning their 
motives, but the end result is that they are ridding them­
selves of outside en cumb e ran ce s and focusing their attention 
more and more within the Subordinate System that is Western 
Europe.
And here, also, the economic struggle carries with 
it political overtones. It might be said that politics 
protects the economic level, while the economic level in 
turn supports the political level. Clashes of interests 
had already taken place. It was primarily in consideration 
of its stake and position in Algeria that moved the French 
to join with Britain and the Israel in the attempt to 
subvert Nasser's position during the Suez crisis. As much 
as the American stance proved humiliating to the British, 
it was equally hard for the French to accept.
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General de Gaulle, during his long tenure in office 
as French President, had as his primary goal the restoration 
of France as the principal power on the European Continent. 
To accomplish this necessitated a severe reduction of an 
American political as well as economic presence on the 
Continent. Servan-Schreiber's book builds a very compel­
ling French case. The moves by the General as regards his 
actions against NATO, and subsequent monetary positions 
against the dollar were in line towards such reduction.20
At the same time, to further the role of France 
as the leader in fact as well as spirit, the General sought 
to hurry the East-West detente along by political moves, 
statements, and trips that would re-establish the previously 
held close French relationship with the Soviet Union thereby 
further reducing the tension-level between the two ideologi­
cal camps.
French recognition of Red China ; withdrawal of the 
French representative at SEATO Ministerial Council meetings; 
General de Gaulle's pronouncements in Cambodia; all seemed 
designed to accomplish the same thing with China as had been 
done with the Soviet Union. There was a tacit recognition 
that a problem did not in fact exist, and with that under­
standing, the assumption that each was relatively free to
2^Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. 
Macridis, and Richard L. Merritt, France, Germany and the 
Western Alliance (New York: Charles Scribner*s Sons, 1Ô6 7), 
pp. 5 8-78.
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pursue what they considered to be their own national 
courses, somewhat assured that those courses would not 
collide.
Coincidental to this was the development of a French 
force de frappe--which would not inhibit in the least the 
stature of France— and the still to be relied upon American 
nuclear deterrence capability that existed in NATO and SEATO, 
organizations that the French had not resigned from.
A further example of clashes within the Subordinate 
System level was the struggle between Britain and France 
concerning British entry into the Common Market. Britain 
wanted in and France wanted to keep her out. And although 
external to Western Europe, the Anglo-American Skybolt 
affair could not but have its adverse effect on British 
standing on the Continent. The British had once again been 
dealt a blow by their American friends.
Thus it can be found that a changed atmosphere and 
conditional setting has come about. It should be no wonder 
then that some of the attitudes of the SEATO powers has also 
been affected by this change.
Slowly taking shape, and thereby creating the begin­
nings of a new trend in the Asiatic area, is a manifestation 
of one of these settings: the appearance of new forms of
Regionalism that is relegated to entirely Asiatic members.
ZTpor an account of this, see Richard Neustadt, 
Alliance Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 
19 70}, pp'. 30-55.
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Starting with the "Colombo" powers conference of 1950,^2 
a new sense and form of regionalism has entered the Asian 
area. States, previously aloof from the problems and 
concerns of other states, slowly began to realize that their 
own problems were also problems of sister states. An aware­
ness of interdependence is gradually displacing previous 
animosities.
Colombo, MaPhillndo, ASA, ASPAC, ASEAN, and ADB all 
represent a moving together rather than a movement away from 
each other. SEATO can fit within this movement.
While there are many differences in the above organi­
zations, it should be recognized that they have a common 
ground in the possible uniting of peoples and societies to 
bring solutions to age-old problems. In this area where 
there is such a serious population problem and where poverty 
is, for the most part, a way of life, there is at least a 
foundation for new hope.
It is significant that some solidarity within the 
Subordinate System of Southern Asia is beginning to make 
itself felt. It bodes a shift away from the Western 
European Subordinate System and even from the Dominant 
System. In this context Western influence is gradually
22Carlos P. Romulo, former Foreign Minister of the 
Philippines, uses the Bandung Asian Conference of 19 5 6 to 
mark the new era of regionalism in Asia. Carlos P. Romulo, 
"The New Asian Ideology," Pacific Community, I (October, 
1969), 37.
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being replaced by the awareness of a newfound strength by 
the units that make up the Southern Asian system.
ASA, ASPAC, and ASEAN all had their beginnings 
after the formation of SEATO. It is noteworthy also that 
Thailand, previously one of the most vocal adherents of 
SEATO, was a firm proponent in the formation of these other 
sub-systems.
Thanat Khoman, the Thai Foreign Minister, made this 
statement :
The European powers in Asia have all returned to 
Europe. They are not interested in this area anymore. 
They are parochial and insular. They are now only 
regional powers.
The British and the French, for example, have left 
forever. The Americans will leave one day. The days 
of the big military pacts are over. In Europe, NATO, 
and in Southeast Asia, SEATO, are in general decay. 
Collective defense arrangements therefore have great 
problems.
What then is left? I have scratched my head hard 
enough to think of alternative policies to meet the 
problems and there is only one answer. All countries 
in the region must rely on themselves. They must stand 
on their own feet, improve their economies, their 
social structures and their capacity to withstand 
subversion from without and from within. This can only 
be done by means of regional co-operation between the 
countries of the area through organizations like ASPAC 
and ASEAN to which we in Thailand attach great impor­
tance as means of political, economic and social inter­
change and the exchange of information of common 
interest.  ̂3
2^Opening Address, Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman 
at the Inaugural Session of the ASEAN Ad Hoc Committee on 
Civil Aviation, Bangkok, June 25, 196 8 (Permanent Mission 
of Thailand to the United Nations, Press Release No. 52, 
July 8, 1968), pp. 3-4.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
110
The formation of such systems does not assure these 
units of automatic success or accomplishment of goals.
There are many problems to be faced, but the very formation 
of such systems is an important step. The membership of the 
several systems is all Asian. Extra-regional powers are 
conspicuous by their absence.
ASPAC— including Japan— is the largest of the new
systems. Somewhat contrary to Thai aims, ASPAC does not
preach any anti-Communist d o c t r i n e , i n  view of the desire
of the Japanese to build stronger economic ties with the
mainland. ASPAC does, however, concentrate on economic,
social, and cultural interests--as does ASEAN. These pacts
may in the future form the basis of some type of security 
9 sarrangement.
The economic character of ASEAN, ASPAC, and others 
can lend great assistance to political stability. In seek­
ing to overcome the visible economic shortcomings that most 
of the developing nations have in Southern Asia, the
2^Kiichi Aichi, "ASPAC Still Young and Fluid," 
Pacific Community, I (October, 1969), 5.
2^Robert Shaplen, Time Out of Hand: Revolution and
Reaction in Southeast Asia (New York: Harper S Row, 1969), 
pp. 16-1Y. See also Bernard K. Gordon, Toward Disengagement 
in Asia: A Strategy for American Foreign Policy (Fnglewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall” 1969) , pp. 9 8-130 . Gorden 
states that ASA (forerunner to ASEAN) represents the 
"second" phase of the development of Asian regionalism; the 
"first" phase being Colombo, ECAFE, and SEATO involving 
non-Asian powers. See Eugene R. Black, Alternative in 
Southeast Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), 
pp. 43-45.
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countries have first had to solve some of their intra- 
regional problems such as the Indonesia and Malaysia problem 
and the differences between the Philippines and Malaysia.
This is being done and steps toward economic 
cooperation and integration are taking place. Adding 
significance to this development is the instituting of the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB). While such asset capabilities 
as the ADB does have is small in comparison to the vast 
demands that can be placed against it, it nonetheless 
signals a new recognized level in the overall regional 
picture unfolding in that part of the world.
Regional development, with its concentration on the 
economic aspect, will not in itself guarantee success for 
the present and future member states. Basic to any success, 
either individually, or collectively, lies the need for 
political stability to be maintained in the respective 
countries. That, of course, hinges on several factors, not 
the least of which is the present rivalry that exists 
between Moscow, Washington, D.C., and Peking.
Economic development for these under-developed 
nations in large measure depends on their ability to make 
an almost total resource allocation toward this goal. 
Implicit within this factor, which in itself presents many 
and varied problems, is that for such an allocation to be 
made, the general area should be free from any "security" 
type problem. At the time of this writing, I do not forsee
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that such a "security" type problem will not in fact present 
itself: either Russia could make a power move into the
Indian Ocean with the subsequent ramifications that that 
could bring with it, or there could be a further intensifi­
cation of the rivalry between Moscow and Peking.
This is problematical and only the future can tell 
what some of the end results will be. It nevertheless 
points to very possible difficulties that lie ahead.
As originally conceived, SEATO, in conjunction with 
NATO, and later with the Baghdad Pact (now CENTO), completed 
the loose geographical framework of containment of the 
Soviet and Chinese Communist threat. The Treaty specified 
both overt and covert threats to its area, and the United 
States stipulation to the Treaty was clearly aimed at a 
Communist threat. This has been and remains the goal of 
SEATO: a rejection of Communist expansion into the Treaty
Area.
The United States action in Vietnam is an indication 
of this country's attitude toward such incursions. That the 
SEATO goal, as manifested by United States action was not 
wholly accepted by members of the system can be seen by the 
minimal specific support given to it by only four members—  
Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines. On 
the other hand, three members— Britain, France, and Pakistan- 
have declined any form of support. And in the case of the
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Philippines, such specific support— 2,000 combat engineers-- 
has now been removed.
Such a degree of non-support is damaging in itself. 
But since South Vietnam is one of the Protocol States of the 
Treaty, the situation is all the more delicate in terms of 
relationships among the member-units.
The situation is further compounded when the factor 
of "stipulated” invitation, as set forth in the Treaty, is 
taken into account. An aggrieved government must first 
invite the participation for SEATO action prior to: (1) it 
becoming an agenda item to be discussed; and (2) a collec­
tive decision being taken for a form of action.
Given the above conditions, it then becomes evident 
that such governments as Laos and South Vietnam would be 
counseled not to make an appeal to SEATO, since it would be 
known beforehand that such an appeal for intervention or 
action on the part of SEATO would be doomed by a failure to 
achieve a unanimous consent.
Three alternatives present themselves. First, those 
units desiring a complete fulfillment or achievement of 
stated or perceived goals may continue to push for these at 
the expense of creating such a condition of stress as to 
endanger the continued existence of the organization.
Second, in lieu of such a fulfillment, the goal might be 
perceptibly altered so as to gain complete unanimity. Third, 
leaving the system intact as it is, unilateral or bilateral
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action on the part of certain powers may be taken, but not 
in the name of the system. It would appear that this third 
alternative is in effect at the present time as regards the 
United States.
But even this third alternative is beginning to 
change under pressure. United States involvement in the 
Vietnamese conflict has never been popular, at home or 
abroad. One of the stated goals of Richard Nixon in his 
Presidential campaign, as well as later when he had assumed 
the office of the Presidency, was that he would bring an 
end to American involvement there. It might be seen that 
such a policy as "Vietnamization," and the espousal of the 
"Nixon Doctrine" to alter the type of any future American 
involvement, represents a feedback response on the part of 
the chief elite of SEATO to make a decided change of policy 
that presumably would find a general consensus within that 
system. It remains to be seen, however, if this will 
result.
It cannot be said that SEATO has been an absolute 
success. Neither can it be said that it has been an abject 
and dismal failure. Success, after all, is a relative 
thing, and given the diversity of membership that exists 
within the SEATO membership, it can naturally be assumed 
that some will be perfectly satisfied with what they con- 
cieve of SEATO having accomplished, while others will take 
an opposite stance.
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The stated objective of SEATO has been the rejection 
of aggression in the Treaty area, or against any state 
designated as aggressive by the SEATO powers. In a strict 
interpretation of that objective, SEATO has indeed fulfilled 
its requirement as a deterrent force. The directed meaning 
of aggression was of course aimed at Peking, With the 
exception of the Sino-Indian border dispute, there has been 
no overt expansive moves by the Chinese since the Korean 
War, which occurred prior to the formation of S E A T O . A t  
the same time, the present Vietnamese conflict should not 
be considered as pertaining to SEATO per se, for it too had 
its beginnings prior to the Manila Pact. That is taking 
into account the legalistic approach which might be used, 
that technically the Geneva Accords of 19 54 had been vio­
lated. It should be remembered, however, that the United 
States was not a signatory to those accords.
It is conjectural what would have happened in South- 
East Asia had there not been the presence of a security sys­
tem like SEATO in effect--the same speculation would lend 
itself to NATO in Europe. Access to diplomatic records in 
Peking and Moscow are unavilable to Westerners, so at this 
time it would be impossible to ascertain whether or not 
Peking really did have expansionist designs in South-East
Z^This of course excludes the Sino-Russo border 
dispute which was limited to strictly Communist powers.
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Asia and was in fact deterred by the factor of SEATO and the 
nuclear might of the United States which backed it up. The 
fact remains, however, that there has been no overt move on 
the part of the Chinese,
The above represents an affirmative or optimistic 
view. A negative or pessimistic view would have to record 
the level of disrepute that SEATO is held in, not only by 
some Third World powers, but by some SEATO members as well. 
If, as some quarters profess, some powers who are members 
of SEATO at present are in effect giving indications to 
Peking that they will do nothing to hinder Chinese moves 
in an area that normally could be considered as being within 
the Chinese sphere of influence, then much of the deterrent 
quality of SEATO would have been nullified. There is no 
denying the fact that disillusionment has set in with some 
members of SEATO, and this could well be an indication of 
future troubles for that organization.
Conclusions
Not too long ago, an American President made a 
statement to the effect that we no longer solve problems 
in the international area, we cite them and try to manage 
them.2 7 In that statement was the recognition that the 
United States does not have the capacity to "solve" problems
2 7gorensen, op. cit., p. 511.
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that erupt from interactions among world powers. To solve 
the problems would mean that the United States would have 
to involve itself with other states, a situation which it 
neither desires nor has the capacity to enact.
In a similar vein, the author would not want to fall 
into a trap of having made an examination of a problem by 
using a still hypothetical approach, adding to it material 
which is not in itself exhaustive, and then trying to draw 
concrete conclusions.
Instead, in the absence of hard conclusions, there 
remain definite indications toward conclusive possibilities.
Likelihood Number One: The forces of polycentrism--
and with it, the subsequent attending attraction of the 
respective Subordinate system— are beginning to make more 
and more of a demand on the individual members of SEATO with 
a resultant reduction of ties to that sub-system. An allu­
sion was made in the beginning that because of membership in 
other systems, both natural and artificial,28 a sort of 
"spill-over" effect was beginning to make itself felt within 
the sub-system of SEATO.
In particular, Britain and France fall into this 
classification because of their European orientation. Their 
membership in the NATO sub-system presents added political
2 8nere the term "natural" refers to geographic 
contiguity, hence Brecher's rationale; while the term 
"artificial" refers to a constructed system made up of 
elements at large whether contiguity is or is not a 
criterion.
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problems which have resulted in divisions between not only 
themselves as units of the system, but also with the chief 
elite.
The presence of EEC adds the element of economics 
and related political problems. As previously stated by the 
French, one of the factors for their opposing British entry 
into EEC was the general unbalanced state of the British 
economy. One of the major drains on any economy— and in 
particular the British--is the budget for defense. Such a 
budget is determined largely by previous or predicted 
political commitments. Such a posture by the British to 
effect serious reductions in their troop commitments on the 
Continent, their policy of withdrawal "East of Suez," and 
the withdrawal from the base at Aden, point to a British 
realignment that is designed to bring about a general 
strengthening of the British economy.
From the French view it would seem that a goal of 
French hegemony on the Continent would in no way be compat­
ible with a more chauvanistic policy elsewhere, particularly 
in Indo-China where memory of the defeat at Dien Bien Phu 
still must be considered a psychological and political 
factor. In addition, with French economic leadership making 
itself felt in former French possessions in Africa, a hard 
political stand in South-east Asia by the French would under­
mine gains already made in these politically sensitive areas.
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A supposition could be made that these factors 
influence to a greater degree the actions of Britain and 
France than do the considerations of SEATO, the other sys­
tem to which they belong.
Likelihood Number Two: The political scene as well
as political leadership is changing. One factor of conse­
quence in that perceived change is an easing of tension in 
the Cold War. A result is the réévaluation of once-held 
doctrines by SEATO members, as well as by other members of 
the Dominant System and Global System.
As pointed out by many responsible political 
scientists and historians, the polarization which once was 
paramount in the international scene has gradually started 
to soften. Political figures of both the East and West have 
for some time made public statements and, we can surmise, 
corresponding diplomatic moves to ease tensions that hereto­
fore marked the division between West and East.
Foremost among the political figures who had sought 
to achieve this re-orientation had been President Charles 
de Gaulle of France. Such a detente (on a bilateral basis) 
has also been sought— and achieved with a high degree of 
success— by the Pakistani. Noteworthy is the fact that 
London, Paris, and Rawalpindi have all recognized Peking.
Note should also be taken of the French persistence 
and courses of action taken designed to "thwart" and thereby 
reduce American influence both in NATO and in the economic
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sector on the Continent. Whether the rapprochement that 
Paris seeks with Moscow has as its base the desire to reduce 
Russian-European tensions and open the way for further 
French hegemony advancements on the Continent, or the ex­
clusion of American economic influence for the same result, 
the political consequences remain the same. The "specter" 
of Soviet expansion into Western Europe is being eroded.
Pakistani pre-occupation with the Kashmir problem 
can be credited with the change of political attitude of 
Rawalpindi toward both Moscow and Peking. In this change, 
it would seem a remote possibility that the Pakistani would 
assume any position which could be construed as being anti- 
Moscow and anti-Peking. With SEATO oriented toward an 
anti-Chinese stand, Pakistani moves, as evidenced by their 
recent statements in SEATO communiques, are a continuation 
of this policy of an "understanding" with the Communist 
giants.
If it can be accepted that a general rapprochement 
is being made, SEATO, as it was conceived, stands in con­
flict with such a movement.
Likelihood Number Three:' A "new" American attitude 
toward general engagement in the Far East and Southeast Asia 
has been given impetus with the several declarations that 
President Nixon has made regarding future commitments of 
United States resources in this area. The "Guam Declara­
tion" and other statements would lead one to believe that.
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once the United States has extricated itself from Vietnam, 
the United States will henceforth revert to a theme of the 
"Forties," that of being an arsenal.
If this is to be the American policy, then this also 
would have a tendency to de-emphasize the SEATO system. A 
forerunner of this policy might be the report by "American 
officials" to the effect that the recent meeting of the 
SEATO Council was largely "ritualistic" in nature.29
Likelihood Number Four: Any "fear" that reliance
on only SEATO commitments might lend an element of danger 
to countries in and around the Treaty Area is offset by the 
contingency of further bilateral ties to the United States, 
and the added emphasis that these might be given. The 
Treaty Area is specified as being in the Asian region.
Such an application is of immediate concern to Thailand on 
the Asian mainland, to a lesser degree by Pakistan which has 
no common border with either the Soviet Union or mainland 
China, and to far lesser degrees by the Philippines, 
Australia, and New Zealand, who are insular.
If we assume that because of the division of inter­
ests that now dominate the member-units of SEATO any direct 
or indirect threat would not find a consensus for action to 
be taken, then we can further assume that defense against 
an actual attack on a member would not be of major concern 
of other units.
29aP dispatch. New York Times, July 4, 1970, p. 1,
col. 8.
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The United States has mutual defense pacts with 
several countries on both a bilateral and a collective 
basis. The Thais, in addition to having treaty obligations 
with the United States, sought to bolster a firmer commit­
ment of the United States to come to the aid of Thailand 
in the case of an attack. This was done through the medium 
of the "special understanding and declaration" enunciated 
between Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman of Thailand and 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk on March 2, 1962.
Australia and New Zealand both place great confi­
dence in their ANZUS pact with the United States. They also 
have close ethnic and linguistic ties to the United States. 
The Philippines also has an advantage of previous ties with 
this country, and this special relationship has been 
constantly reinforced by the various administrations since 
the granting of Philippine independence.
Any "fear" that reliance only on SEATO commitments 
might endanger the security of these countries is offset by 
this contingency of further ties to the United States.
Likelihood Number Five: The question of security
remains one of great importance. What condition or setting 
that may be in effect today does not necessarily guarantee 
its continuance. With the absence of a security type 
orientation in ASEAN, ASPAC, and Colombo, the qualitative 
security factor of the already established sub-system of 
SEATO could offer an answer to that problem, assuming that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
12 3
problem-perception and membership could be altered without 
a disruption to the system. SEATO has as its primary func­
tion the generation of a military capability, should the 
need arise. Of secondary importance is the social-economic- 
cultural capacity that it now supports. While such a 
supportive role could fulfill an integrative function for 
SEATO, it is doubtful that, given other political considera­
tions which weigh against it, this would greatly help the 
organization.
The extra-regional membership of such an "Asian" 
organization grossly outweighs any contributive role.
There has been agitation on the part of Asian powers for 
the creation of a strict Asian organization whose membership 
would be restricted to only Asian members. ASA, ASPAC, and 
ASEAN (successor to ASA) can be seen as a large step in this 
direction. Thailand, while once the most vocal United 
States supporter, has done an almost about-face in this 
regard, and makes no secret of her disillusionment with 
SEATO. Thailand was the creative force in ASA and ASEAN, 
and from all outward appearances would seem to be a strong 
advocate of ASPAC.
Pakistan, in addition to her CENTO ties— which by 
her own admission she no longer believes to be of any con­
sequence— is merging more and more into an economic 
partnership with the ROD— Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey.
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It would seem, therefore, that with these moves now 
afoot, the future of SEATO is questionable. The issue of 
security is one that is always present, and given the fact 
that the Asian alliances at this time do not provide for 
such a collective entity, this could prove to be a positive 
factor on the side of SEATO. If, however, the question of 
security is solved on strictly an Asian basis, then a dras­
tic change in SEATO goals would have to evolve, if the 
organization were to survive.
Likelihood Number Six: SEATO— according to the
United States understanding appended to the Treaty— was 
formed as a defensive vehicle to ". . . apply only to
onCommunist aggression. . . . "  Explicitly, this would refer 
to overt or open Red Chinese invasion of any of the signa­
tory or Protocol powers. Implicitly--and events lately 
would tend to lean this way— a "new" recognizable influence 
is seeming to shape itself in regard to interpretive under­
standings. A revised view of the problem of insurgency, as 
a type and form of "aggression," is beginning to take form.
A new attitude seems to be developing by the SEATO 
powers to the effect that problems of insurgency are "local" 
and therefore are the exclusive problem of the state in 
which they occur.
If we can accept at face value some of the state­
ments of the Red Chinese hierarchy regarding "insurgency"
30Appendix C, p. 134.
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and forms of "national liberation," then it would seem to 
follow that new forms of resistance would have to be 
developed. In this context, perhaps the old form of "col­
lective" security is archaic and must be replaced by new 
concepts. If this is true, then it follows that internal 
stability of the state is a prerequisite to the fashioning 
of a.defense against internal disturbances, whether intern­
ally or externally organized.
Assistance in peaceful nation-building steps would 
seem to be the order of the day. Rather than expending 
large resources on conventional armed forces, a shift to 
socio-economic emphasis might realize greater benefits in 
the long range period, thereby completely obviating the 
necessity for today’s thoughts on collective security.
This is not to say that in developing nations there 
is no need for some type of conventional force. Internal 
"policing" is still a requirement that is needed not only 
by developing, but by developed nations as well. But 
should external threats be seen as no longer valid, then an 
allocation of resources could be shifted to the all impor­
tant sector of building up the society and capacity of the 
country.
From the evidence at hand, these six conclusions 
have been drawn. At the outset, no claim was made as to 
this being an exhaustive review. The very fact that the 
nation-states involved--the United States, Great Britain,
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France, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New 
Zealand, and their natural membership in other Subordinate 
Systems— precludes such an examination, for it would of 
necessity be too wide range and far reaching. Of necessity, 
this review has confined itself to some chosen aspects of 
political interaction which occurred between these various 
states over a period of time.
Five criteria were envisaged as contributing to the 
basic problem involved with SEATO: first, was the issue of
problem-perception of the member-states, and how they 
originally conceived themselves in relationship to the 
organization, and their subsequent re-evaluation of that 
perception. Second, the issue created by a necessity of 
some of the nations to become more "inward" seeking because 
of either a reduction of "power" status, or a demand on the 
part of their societies to allocate more available resources 
to internal problems, or a combination of both. Third, the 
evolvement of a form of polycentrism whereby natural geo­
graphic contiguities form themselves into meaningful Sub­
ordinate systems which in turn can be accompanied by cross­
purpose demands in any interaction which occur between these 
systems. Also the various members of the respective sys­
tems, seeking a position of primacy within those systems, 
can increase the number of conflicting demands due to the 
very nature of their struggle within that system. Fourth 
is the overlapping issue of the Cold War which is closely
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interwoven in the above but which, because of the two 
nations involved and the respective power they have, must 
be singled out. And fifth is the issue of the political 
interactions which took place between some of the member- 
states and the resultant consequences which followed.
This then was the thesis presented. Evidence has 
been examined, a discussion made of that evidence, and from 
that, six probable conclusions have been drawn. Although 
these conclusions are not of an absolute nature, it remains 
the feeling of this author that conditions remain too fluid 
to do otherwise. At the same time, I am confident that 
these will serve as guidelines by which to observe future 
developments in this area.
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APPENDIX A
MEETINGS OF THE SOUTH EAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1 9 6 9  
19 70
February
March
March
March
April
(September)
May
March
April
April
May
June
April
April
May
June
Bangkok, Thailand 
Karachi, Pakistan 
Camberra, Australia 
Manila, the Philippines 
Wellington, New Zealand 
Washington, D.C.* 
Washington, D.C. 
Bangkok, Thailand 
(no formal meeting) 
Paris, France 
Manila, the Philippines 
London, England 
Camberra, Australia 
Washington, D.C. 
Wellington, New Zealand 
Bangkok, Thailand 
Manila, the Philippines
*Special meeting of the Council of Ministers
129
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPENDIX B 
ABBREVIATIONS USED
ABD ..........  Asian Development Bank
ANZUS ........  Australia, New Zealand, United States
Security Pact
A S A .......... Association of Southeast Asia
A S E A N ........ Association of Southeast Asia
(successor to ASA)
ASPAC ........  Asian Pacific Council
CENTO ........  Central Treaty Organization
EDO ..........  European Defense Community
EEC ..........  European Economic Community
EFTA ..........  European Free Trade Association
MAPHILINDO . . . Malaysia, Philippine, Indonesian Pact
NATO ..........  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ROD ..........  Regional Cooperation for Development
SEATO ........  Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
UN ............  United Nations
UNICIP . . . .  United Nations Commission on India and
Pakistan
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APPENDIX C
THE SOUTH-EAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENCE 
TREATY AND THE PACIFIC CHARTER
(Manila, 8 September 195*4)
The Parties to this Treaty,
Recognizing the sovereign equality of all the Parties, 
Reiterating their faith in the purposes and principles set 
forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire 
to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments,
Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights 
of self-determination of peoples, and declaring that they 
will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote 
self-government and to secure the independence of all 
countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake 
its responsibilities.
Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and 
to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty 
and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being 
and development of all peoples in the Treaty Area,
Intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of 
unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that 
the Parties stand together in the area, and
Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective 
defence for the preservation of peace and security.
Therefore agree as follows:
ARTICLE 1.
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the 
United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which 
they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security and justice are not endan­
gered, and to refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with 
the purposes of the United Nations.
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ARTICLE II.
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this 
Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of 
continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will 
maintain and develop their individual and collective 
capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter 
subversive activities directed from without against their 
territorial integrity and political stability.
ARTICLE III.
The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions 
and to cooperate with one another in the further develop­
ment of economic measures, including technical assistance, 
designed both to promote economic progress and social 
well-being and to further the individual and collective 
efforts of governments toward these ends.
ARTICLE IV.
1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed 
attack in the Treaty Area against any of the Parties or 
against any State or territory which the Parties by unani­
mous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its 
own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event 
act to meet the common danger in accordance with its con­
stitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph 
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the 
United Nations.
2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviola­
bility or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty 
of political independence of any Party in the Treaty Area 
or of any other State or territory to which the provisions 
of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is 
threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is 
affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might 
endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult 
immediately in order to agree on the measures which should 
be taken for the common defence.
3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any 
State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 
of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be 
taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the 
government concerned.
ARTICLE V.
The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of 
them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning
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the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall 
provide for consultation with regard to military and any 
other planning as the situation obtaining in the Treaty 
Area may from time to time require. The Council shall be 
so organized as to be able to meet at any time.
ARTICLE VI.
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted 
as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of any 
of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or 
the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance 
of international peace and security. Each Party declares 
that none of the international engagements now in force 
between it and any other of the Parties or any third party 
is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and 
undertakes not to enter into any international engagement 
in conflict with this Treaty.
ARTICLE VII.
Any other State in a position to further the objectives of 
this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the area 
may, by unanimous agreement of the Parties, be invited to 
accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a 
Party of the Treaty by depositing its instrument of 
accession with the Government of the Republic of the 
Philippines. The Government of the Republic of the 
Philippines shall inform each of the Parties of the deposit 
of each such instrument of accession.
ARTICLE VIII.
As used in this Treaty, the "Treaty Area" is the general 
area of South-East Asia, including also the entire terri­
tories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of the 
South-West Pacific not including the Pacific area north 
of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The Parties may, 
by unanimous agreement, amend this Article to include within 
the Treaty Area the territory of any State acceding to this 
Treaty in accordance with Article VII or otherwise to change 
the Treaty Area.
ARTICLE IX.
1. This Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the 
Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Duly 
certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that 
Government to the other signatories.
2. The Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried 
out by the Parties in accordance with their respective
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constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification 
shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government 
of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall notify all 
of the other signatories of such deposit.
3. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States 
which have ratified it as soon as the instruments of 
ratification of a majority of the signatories shall have 
been deposited, and shall come into effect with respect to 
each other State on the date of the deposit of its instru­
ment of ratification.
ARTICLE X.
This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but any 
Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice 
of denunciation has been given to the Government of the 
Republic of the Philippines, which shall inform the 
Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each 
notice of denunciation.
ARTICLE XI.
The English text of this Treaty is binding on the Parties, 
but when the Parties have agreed to the French text thereof 
and have so notified the Government of the Republic of the 
Philippines, the French text shall be equally authentic and 
binding on the Parties.
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the u n i t e d states of AMERICA
The United States of America in executing the present Treaty 
does so with the understanding that its recognition of the 
effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with 
reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to 
Communist aggression but affirms that in the event of other 
aggression or armed attack it will consult under the pro­
visions of Article IV, paragraph 2.
In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have 
signed this Treaty.
Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954*
*Signed for Australia by Richard G. Casey, Minister of 
External Affairs; for France by Guy La Chambre, Minister 
of State; for New Zealand by T. Clifton Webb, Minister of 
External Affairs; for Pakistan by Chaudhri Muhammad Zafrulla 
Khan, Foreign Minister; for the Republic of the Philippines 
by Carlos P. Garcia, Vice President and Secretary of Foreign
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
135
Affairs, Francisco A. Delgado, Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Thomas L. Cahili, 
Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada, and Representative Cornelio T. 
Villareal; for Thailand by Prince Wan Waithayakon Krommun 
Naradhip Bongsprabandh, Minister of Foreign Affairs; for 
the United States by John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, 
Senator H. Alexander Smith, and Senator Michael J. Mansfield.
PROTOCOL TO THE SOUTH-EAST ASIA COLLECTIVE 
DEFENCE TREATY
Designation of states and territory as to which provisions 
of Article IV and Article III are to be applicable:
The Parties to the South-East Asia Collective Defence 
Treaty unanimously designate for the purposes of Article IV 
of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free 
territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam.
The Parties further agree that the above mentioned states 
and territory shall be eligible in respect of the economic 
measures contemplated by Article III.
This Protocol shall enter into force simultaneously with 
the coming into force of the Treaty.
In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have 
signed this Protocol to the South-East Asia Collective 
Defence Treaty.
Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 19 54.
THE PACIFIC CHARTER
The delegates of Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, 
the Republic of the Philippines, the Kingdom of Thailand, 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
the United States of America:
Desiring to establish a firm basis for common action to 
maintain peace and security in South-East Asia and the 
South-West Pacific;
Convinced that common action to this end in order to be 
worthy and effective, must be inspired by the highest 
principles of justice and liberty;
Do hereby proclaim:
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First, in accordance with the provisions of the United 
Nations Charter, they uphold the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples and they will earnestly 
strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government 
and to secure the independence of all countries whose 
peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsi­
bilities ;
Second, they are each prepared to continue taking effective 
practical measures to endure conditions favourable to the 
orderly achievement of the foregoing purposes in accordance 
with their constitutional procedures ;
Third, they will continue to cooperate in the economic, 
social and cultural fields in order to promote higher 
living standards, economic progress and social well-being 
in this region;
Fourth, as declared in the South-East Asia Collective 
Defence Treaty, they are determined to prevent or counter 
by appropriate means any attempt in the Treaty Area to 
subvert their freedom or to destroy their sovereignty or 
territorial integrity.
Proclaimed at Manila, this eighth day of September, 19 5 4.
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